

4 The Soul of Chinese Buddhism

Buddha-nature and universal awakening: the rise of Chinese Buddhist humanism

4.1 Buddhicizing the Chinese “soul”

4.1.1 The Nirvāna Sūtras. Like many other ancient cultures, the Chinese, too, have a concept of a soul or abiding entity that survives the person’s death. The Chinese word for such an abiding entity is *línghún* 靈魂. One of ancient China’s largest and wealthiest temple, built in 328 (Eastern Jin dynasty) by the Indian monk, Huilǐ 慧理,¹ is called *Língyǐn Sì* 靈隱寺, the “Temple of the Soul’s Retreat,” belonging to the Chán school, located north-west of Hangzhou, Zhejiang province. In its heyday, during the kingdom of Wúyuè guó 吳越國 (907-978) [5.1.2.1], the temple boasted of 9 multi-storey buildings, 18 pavilions, 72 halls, more than 1300 dormitory rooms, inhabited by more than 3000 monks. Many of the rich Buddhist carvings in the *Fēilái fēng* 飛來峰 grottos and surrounding mountains also date from this era.

The Chinese word for *anattā* (P) or *anātman* (Skt) (not-self) is *wúwǒ* 無我, literally meaning “not-I.” There is no Chinese word for *not-línghun*. As such, although a Chinese Buddhist would intellectually or verbally accept the notion that there is no *I* (that is, an agent in an action), he would probably unconsciously hold on to the idea of some sort of independent abiding entity or eternal identity, that is, the *línghun*, which is in effect the equivalent of the brahmanical *ātman*. The situation becomes more complicated with Mahāyāna discourses, such as the Nirvāna Sūtra, that speak of a transcendent Buddha-nature as the true self.²

The *Dà nièpán jīng* 大涅槃經 or Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra³ is a Mahāyāna version of the Buddha’s final discourse, which stresses on the fact that all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature *fóxìng* 佛性, and that all beings, even the spiritually rootless *icchantika* (*yīchǎntí* 一闍提) [3.4.5.2], will become Buddhas. The *Dà nièpán jīng* is one of the major texts of East Asian Mahāyāna Buddhism, of which there are a number of variant translations including:

- (1) *Fó bān ní huán jīng* 佛般泥洹經 (Buddha Parinirvāṇa Sūtra), T5, 2 fascicles (*juǎn* 卷), translated in Cháng’ān by Báifǎzǔ 白法祖, sometime between 290 and 307.⁴
- (2) *Dà bānníhuán jīng* 大般泥洹經 (Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra), T376.12.853-899, 6 fascicles, translated in the Eastern Qín by Buddhahadra and Fǎxiǎn 法顯 of Eastern Jin, in 416-418.⁵
- (3) *Dà bānnièpán jīng* 大般涅槃經 (Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra), T374.12.365c-603c, 40 fascicles, translated in the Northern Liang by Dharma,kṣema, *Tán wúchèn* 曇無讖, in 416-423; also called the

¹ Not to be confused with Huilǐ 慧立/惠立 (615 -?), a Táng monk, who respected the works of Xuánzàng Sānzàng 玄奘三藏, and wrote a biography on him entitled *Dàicēnsì sānzàng fǎshī zhuàn* 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳. When Huilǐ 慧理 came to Hángzhōu in 326, he was drawn to the mountainous ambience as a place of “the soul’s retreat,” and founded Língyǐn monastery there. In the Liáng 梁 dynasty, Wǔdì (武帝, emperor 502-550) who generally had a positive attitude toward Buddhism endowed Língyǐn Temple with rich land properties. Emperor Jiǎnwén (簡文, r 550-552) wrote a report on this donation, one which is titled *Cì língyǐnsì tián jì* (賜靈隱寺田記 Report Concerning the Donation of Land to Língyǐn Temple). See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?97.xml+id\('b9748-96b1-5bfa'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?97.xml+id('b9748-96b1-5bfa')).

² See *Dictionary of Buddhism*, sv *ātman*.

³ The Āgama versions are found in T1.11, T 1.160, T1.176, T1.191, T24.382b-399c. Treatises on the sūtra are *Dà bān nièpán jīng hòufēn* 大般涅槃經後分 (The Latter Portion of the Sūtra on the Great Decease) 2 *juǎn* tr Jñāna-bhadra (Unlike other versions, it focuses mainly on the actuality of the Buddha’s entry into extinction); 大般涅槃經疏 33 *juǎn*; 大般涅槃經論 1 *juǎn* by Vasubandhu, tr by Bodhidharma. See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?59.xml+id\('b5927-822c-6d85-69c3-7d93'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?59.xml+id('b5927-822c-6d85-69c3-7d93')).

⁴ Very close in content to *Bānníhuán jīng* 般泥洹經 (T6), with one major difference being that of the venue, which is Kuśi,nagara (*Jūyí* 拘夷) rather than Rāja,grha (*Wángshè chéng* 王舍城).

⁵ See http://www.acmuller.net/descriptive_catalogue/files/k0106.html. On this text’s connection with the “last days,” see Buswell 1990: 87 & 113 n33.

Northern Edition (*Běiběn* 北本) or the Great Edition (*Dàběn* 大本), that is, *Nirvāna Sūtra* (*Běiběn nièpán jīng* 北本涅槃經).

- (4) *Dà bānnièpán jīng* 大般涅槃經 (same title), T375.12.605-852, 36 fascicles translated in the Sòng by Jñāna, bhadrā (Huìyán 慧嚴) and Huìníng 會寧; that is, the Southern Edition (*nánběn* 南本). (A revised edition of (3) by Huìguān, Huìyān and Xiè Língyūn,⁶ during the Yuánjiā 元嘉 period, Liú-sòng dynasty 劉宋 (424-452).⁷

The original sutra had probably become quite expanded by the time Dharma, kṣema translated it, since the text brought back from India by the pilgrim Fǎxiǎn (no 2) was only a small work of 6 fascicles, while Dharmakṣema's later translation was in 40 fascicles (no 3), that is, the "Northern Edition." Still later, Huìguān 慧觀 (363-343) of Dào-chǎng sì 道場寺, Huìyán 慧嚴 (363-443) of Wūyī sì 烏衣寺 [4.1.2.10], Xiè Língyūn 謝靈運 (385-433) [4.1.2.12], amongst others, of the Liú-sòng 劉宋 dynasty integrated and amended the translations of Fǎxiǎn and Dharma, kṣema, into a single edition of 36 fascicles (no 4), known as the "Southern Edition."⁸

As we shall later see, the Nirvana Sutras played a key role in supporting various uniquely Chinese views, such as "sudden awakening," [4.1.2.7], inherent awakening [4.2], and *icchantika* doctrine [4.1.2.-12; 4.3]. Before we examine those new doctrines, let us look at the early Buddhist teachings on the gradual awakening.

4.1.2 Gradual versus sudden. [2.2.4]

4.1.2.1 EARLY BUDDHIST GRADUALISM. The Vinaya records a very instructive story about how the Buddha refuses to conduct Pāṭimokkha recital one observance day, by simply remaining silent. When Ānanda asks the Buddha for the reason of his silence, the Buddha replies that "the congregation is not entirely pure," that is, there is a monk in their midst who has broken a Vinaya rule (he has not confessed an offence he has committed).

After Moggallāna has removed the offending monk from the congregation, the Buddha goes on to discourse on the parable of the great ocean. He begins by stating that the Buddha-Dharma has eight remarkable and wonderful qualities (*aṭṭha acchariyā abbhūtā dhammā*), seeing which a monk delights in this Dharma-Vinaya (*ye divvā divvā bhikkhū imasmim dhamma, vinaye abhiraṃanti*). One of these eight qualities is very relevant here:

"Bhikshus, just as the great ocean deepens gradually, slopes gradually, inclines gradually, not abruptly, like a cliff, even so, too, bhikshus, in this Dharma-Vinaya there is a gradual training, a gradual task, a gradual path, not a sudden realization of direct knowledge."

⁶ Xiè Língyūn (385-433), also known as the Duke of Kānglè (*Kānglè gōng* 康樂公), a devout Buddhist, one of the foremost Chinese poets of the Southern and Northern Dynasties, China's first nature poet, enthusiastic mountaineer and landscape gardener. Brought up as a Daoist, in his youth he was a fervent convert to Buddhism. He was once a part of the intellectual community on Mt Lu, under the famous monk Huìyūan [3.4.4.4], and distinguished himself by his essays on Buddhist philosophy and tr of several sutras. But his real contribution to Chinese literature lies in his allusive and complex nature poetry, which grew out of his love for the mountains and waters of Zhejiang and Jiangsi. He was considered a nature or landscape poet focusing on the "mountain and streams" (*shānshuǐ* 山水) instead of "field and garden" (*tiányuán* 田園) landscapes. The best of his poems evoke a sense of mystery experienced in the high mountains and in the beautiful lake and river scenery of the south. See Lingyin XIE, *The Mountain Poems of Hsieh Ling-yun*, tr David Hinton, NY: New Directions Publishing Corp, 2001. See *Cambridge Ency of China* 2nd ed 1991: 348 & <http://www.bookrags.com/biography/hsieh-ling-yun/>.

⁷ See <http://www.nirvanasutra.org.uk/index.htm> for a complete Kosho Yamamoto English of the "Southern" ed of the Dharmakṣema *Nirvāna Sūtra*, in a version rev & ed by Tony Page, as well as his German tr (the first ever carried out) of the Tib version of the *Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra*, based on Stephen Hodge's (unpublished) English tr.

⁸ See JIANG Jiányún 姜劍雲, XIÈ Língyūn 謝靈運 & Huìyán 慧嚴, Huìguān 慧觀: <http://www.ilib.cn/A-hebdxzb-zxsh200506017.html>. For Patton's partial tr of T375.12.647a-c (ch 1-3, 6, 10, 11, 15), see http://www.abuddhistlibrary.com/Buddhism/C-Zen/Sutras/The_Great_Parinirvana_Sutra/The_Great_Parinirvana_Sutra.htm.

Seyyathāpi bhikkhave mahā,samuddo anupubba,ninno anupubba,poṇo anupubba,pabbhāro na āyataken'eva papāto. Evam eva kho bhikkhave imasmim' dhamma,vinaye anupubba,sikkhā anupubba,kiriyā anupubba,paṭipadā na āyataken'eva aññā.paṭivedho. Cv 9.1.4 = V 2:238 f)

At the very root and foundation of Buddhism lies the gradual way, as attested by these various terms relating to the whole gamut of early Buddhism, that is to say:⁹

a gradual teaching	<i>ānupubbī,kathā</i>	}	(V 1:15; D 1:10; A 4:186; U 49; J 1:8, 50), ¹⁰
a gradual training	<i>anupubba,sikkhā</i>		}
a gradual task	<i>anupubba,kiriyā</i>	(V 2:238; M 1:479, 3:1; A 4:201, 107; U 54); ¹¹	
a gradual path	<i>anupubba,paṭipadā</i>		
a gradual act	<i>anupubba,karaṇa</i>	(M 1:446),	
a gradual meditation	<i>anupubba,vihāra</i> ¹²		(D 3:265; M 1:479; A 4:102, 207, 410; ¹³ and
a gradual practitioner	<i>anupubba,vihārī</i>		(U 78).

We will now examine a few important contexts of these terms, especially in terms of the threefold training, as found in the early Buddhist canon.

One of the most basic and important expressions of the gradual development of the fruits of recluship is the formula of progressive talk (*ānupubbī,kathā*), here given in full:

Then the Blessed One gave him a progressive talk—that is to say, he spoke on
giving (*dāna*),
moral virtue (*sīla*), and
the heavens (*sagga*).

He explained

the danger, the vanity and the disadvantages of sensual pleasures (*kāma'dīnava*), and
the advantages of renunciation (*nekkhamm'ānisaṃsa*).

When the Blessed One perceived that the listener's mind was *prepared, pliant, free from obstacles, elevated and lucid*, then he explained to him the teaching peculiar to the Buddhas (*buddhānaṃ sāmukkaṃsika' desanā*), that is to say, suffering (*dukkha*), its arising, its cessation, and the path.
 (V 1:15; D 1:148; A 3:184 etc)

4.1.2.2 THE BHADDĀLI SUTTA (M 65). In other words, only when the audience is mentally ready and emotionally prepared, would the Buddha go on to teach them the noble eightfold path (that is, the fourth noble truth). There are at least four occasions recorded in the Majjhima Nikāya of the Buddha illustrating the need for gradual training. In the Bhaddāli Sutta (M 65), the Buddha uses the parable of a thoroughbred colt (*ājānīya,susu*). A wise horse-trainer would progressively accustom the colt to ten stages of training. The first stage is that of (1) wearing a bit, which it actively rejects at first, but soon gets used to it. Then he trains the colt (2) to wear the harness in the same manner; (3) to keep in step; (4) to run in a circle; (5) to prance; (6) to gallop; (7) to charge; (8) in royal gracefulness; (9) in speed; and (10) in gentleness. Finally, the trainer rewards the colt with a good rub-down and grooming.¹⁴

The Buddha then links the parable to how the arhat possesses the ten "rightness" (*sammatta*), that is, the eightfold path—right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration—and right knowledge and right liberation. These last two are the special qualities of the arhat. Implicitly, this means that a trainee or a learner begins with having some level of *right view* (which according to the Mahā Cattārīsaka Sutta (M 117) underlies all other seven

⁹ For a study, see The Gradual Way = SD 56.1.

¹⁰ Also at Miln 228; Vism 249; DA 258; UA 173; VvA 208. See CPD: ānupubbi-kathā.

¹¹ Also MA 3:193.

¹² There is also the comy term, "progressive attainment" (*anupubba,samāpatti*, MA 2:30).

¹³ Also VbhA 423.

¹⁴ M 65.32-34/1:445-447 = SD 56.2.

path factors),¹⁵ and progressively cultivates each of the path factors. It is important to understand here that the factor-sequence here is followed *only* in the instruction of the trainee.¹⁶ For, in practice, all the factors have to function together [as stated under “The fruits of recluship,” below]. The significance of this point becomes clearer when we examine the same parable where it appears in the Gaṇaka Moggallāna Sutta (M 107), next.

4.1.2.3 THE GAṆAKA MOGGALLĀNA SUTTA (M 107). The first half of the **Gaṇaka Moggallāna Sutta** (M 107) significantly, deals with “the gradual training, gradual practice, gradual progress” (*anupubba, sikkhā anupubba, kiriyā anupubba, paṭipadā*) (M 107.1-11). The Sutta briefly mentions the parable of thoroughbred colt (already explicated in the **Bhaddāli Sutta** (M 65.3), see above), which the Buddha uses to show, in practical terms, how he trains a person.

First, the trainee is trained in the precepts, after which he is taught sense-restraint,¹⁷ then moderation in eating,¹⁸ then wakefulness (including walking meditation alternating with restful sleep),¹⁹ then the practice of mindfulness and full awareness, then sitting meditation to clear the mind of the mental hindrances,²⁰ and finally dhyana attainment. The training sequence here again is that of moral virtue (*sīla*), followed by mental concentration (*samādhi*), that is, meditation, and finally the practitioner gains wisdom leading to “right direct knowledge” (*samma-d-aññā*), that is, arhathood.²¹

4.1.2.4 THE KIṬĀGIRI SUTTA (M 70). **The Kiṭāgiri Sutta** (M 70) contains very important evidence regarding “the gradual training” (*anupubba, sikkhā*), that is, the spiritual learning process in twelve stages, which is also found in the **Caṅkī Sutta** (M 95). The 12-step training of early Buddhism is summarized as follows:

- (1) Faith (*saddhā*) conduces one to visit (that is, to see) a teacher.
- (2) Approaching (*upasaṅkamana*) the teacher conduces one to respectfully attending to the teacher.
- (3) Respectfully drawing near (*payirupāsana*) to the teacher conduces to lending the ear.
- (4) Lending the ear [listening attentively] (*sotāvadhāna*) conduces to listening to the Dharma.
- (5) Listening to the Dharma (*dhamma, savana*) conduces to remembering the Dharma.
- (6) Remembering the Dharma (*dhamma, dhāraṇā*) conduces to the examination of its meaning.
- (7) Investigating the meaning (*atth’upaparikkhā*) of the teachings helps us reflectively accept them (or to accept them after pondering on them).
- (8) Reflectively accepting the teachings (*dhamma, nijjhāna, khanti*) conduces to will-power [desire].
- (9) Will-power [wholesome desire] (*chanda*) conduces to effort.
- (10) Exertion (*ussāha*) conduces to scrutiny.
- (11) Weighing [balancing the practice] (*tulanā*) conduces to striving.
- (12) Striving on (*pahit’atta*), he realizes through his own body the supreme truth and sees it by penetrating it with wisdom [arhathood].

(M 70.23-24/1:480 = SD 11.1) = (M 95.20/2:173 = SD 21.15)

This teaching is a progressive twelve-step “psychology of learning.” The learning process is not just a matter of rote or book-learning, but of spiritual friendship with the teacher (1-4), which in turn is a fertile ground for learning (5-8), which leads to efforts in spiritual change (9-12) and realization. The progressive growth of learning is clearly evident here.²²

¹⁵ M 117/3:71-78 = SD 6.10.

¹⁶ There is also another teaching or theoretical (*pariyatti*) sequence, namely, that of the eight factors as aggregates of the threefold training, the sequence of *moral virtue* (right speech, right action, right livelihood), *mental concentration* (right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration), and *wisdom* (right view, right intention).

¹⁷ For practical teaching on sense-restraint, see *Nimitta* and *Anuvyañjana* = SD 19.14.

¹⁸ *Bhojane mattaññutā*, see Nanda S (A 8.9/4:166-168).

¹⁹ On this, and most of the other trainings listed here (in this sentence), see also **Satipaṭṭhāna S** (M 10.4-9/1:56 f) = SD 13.3.

²⁰ On the mental hindrances (*pañca, nīvaraṇā*), see SD 32, esp The Five Mental Hindrances = SD 32.1.

²¹ M 107.1-11/3:1-4 = SD 56.3

²² M 70.23/1:480 f = SD 11.1.

The **Kiṭāgiri Sutta** (M 70) presents a piece of indirect evidence by way of the process of the gradual realization of the “wisdom-liberated” saint (*paññā, vimutta*), who is defined as follows:

And, bhikshus, what sort of individual is the wisdom-liberated?

Here, bhikshus, a certain person does not dwell in those liberations that are peaceful and formless, transcending forms, having touched the liberations with the body, but his mental influxes are utterly destroyed through his having seen them with wisdom.

This individual, bhikshus, is called the wisdom-liberated. (M 70.16/1:477 f) = SD 11.1

As noted by Ivan Strenski, “the Buddha implies [here that] the *paññā, vimutta* seems to achieve *nirvana* immediately (in both spatial and temporal senses), because he *has previously* achieved those stages of sanctity which others may only now be set to achieve.” (1980: 6). In fact, we see the same implication when we examine all other saints or true individuals mentioned in the Kiṭāgiri Sutta.²³

4.1.2.5 THE FRUITS OF RECLUSESHIP. Perhaps, the most convincing evidence in the early Buddhist canon on the gradual training is found in the “the fruits of recluseship” (*sāmañña, phala*). The whole opening chapter (*vagga*) of the Sutta Piṭaka (Basket of Discourses) deals with the gradual way. The chapter consists of 13 suttas (forming the *Sīla-k, khandha Vagga*),²⁴ dealing with the fruits of recluseship (D 1:1-253).²⁵ Technically, the “fruits” of recluseship are fourfold: stream-winning, once-return, non-return and arhathood.²⁶ Often, however, the *stages* of the fruits of recluseship are laid out, as in the *Sāmañña, phala Sutta* (D 2).²⁷ The elaborate stages of the fruits of recluseship generally follow a well-defined order of the threefold training (*sikkhā*):²⁸ the preliminary stages of the path cultivate “moral virtue” (*sīla*), the middle stages “mental concentration” (*samādhi*), and the final stages “wisdom” (*paññā*):²⁹

This is moral virtue, this is concentration, this is wisdom. Concentration, when well cultivated³⁰ with moral virtue, brings great fruit and great profit. Wisdom, when well cultivated with concentration, brings great fruit and great profit. The mind, when well cultivated with wisdom, becomes completely free from the mental influxes,³¹ that is to say, from the influx of sensual lust, the influx of existence, the influx of false views and the influx of ignorance. (V 1:15; D 1:10)

²³ See **Kiṭāgiri S** (70) = SD 11.1 Intro (5).

²⁴ “The chapter on the groups of moral virtue,” comprising vol 1 of the Pali Text Society’s ed of *Dīgha*.

²⁵ This usage of the term is found at D 1:51 f; *Vism* 215; *VvA* 71; *VbhA* 317. The *Majjhima* appears to use a slightly abbreviated form of the *sīla-k, khandha vagga* material (M 1:178-184, 267-271, 3:33-36, 134-147. See Gethin 2001:208 for details.

²⁶ D 3:227, 277; S 5:25; *Dhs* 1016; *DhsA* 423; *Miln* 344, 358; three mentioned at *Kvu* 112.

²⁷ D 2/1:47-86 = SD 8.10.

²⁸ D 1:207, 3:220; A 1:229.

²⁹ Gethin’s n: “In the *sīlakkhandha-vagga* the terminology in fact varies. The *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, while giving the account in full, does not explicitly divide it into three categories. This is true also of the *Kūṭadanta-, Mahāli-, Jāliya-, Kevaddha-* and *Lohicca-suttas*. (The *Porḥhapāda-* and *Tevijja-suttas* depart from the standard pattern after the account of the fourth *jhāna*, inserting descriptions of the four formless attainments and four *brahma-vihāras* respectively.) In the *Ambaṭṭha-sutta* the categories are just two, *carana* and *vijjā*; in the *Soṇadaṇḍa-sutta* just as *sīla* and *paññā*; in the *Kassapasīhanāda-sutta* they are *sīla-sampadā* and *paññā-sampadā*; in the *Subha-sutta* they are called *sīla-kkhandha*, *samādhu-kkhandha* and *paññā-kkhandha*.” (2001:207 n79).

³⁰ “Well cultivated,” *paribhāvito*. In a stock simile, eggs are said to be *paribhāvītāni* (M 1:104; S 3:153) by a brooding hen. According to Rhys Davids, in medicine, the word means “charged with, impregnated with.” See J 1:380, 4:407; cf *Miln* 361, 382, 394; cf *Bhagavad Gītā* 3.38 for this simile.

³¹ “Mental influxes,” *āsava*. The term *āsava* (lit “inflow, outflow”) comes from *ā-savati* “flows towards” (ie either “into” or “out” towards the observer). It has been variously translated as taints (“deadly taints,” RD), corruptions, intoxicants, biases, depravity, misery, evil (influence), or simply left untranslated. The *Abhidhamma* lists 4 *āsavas*: the influxes of (1) sense-desire (*kāma-āsava*), (2) (desire for eternal) existence (*bhav-āsava*), (3) wrong views (*diṭṭh-āsava*), (4) ignorance (*avijjāsava*) (D 16.1.12/2:82, 16.2.4/2:91, Pm 1.442, 561, *Dhs* §§1096-1100, *Vbh* §937). These four are also known as “floods” (*ogha*) and “yokes” (*yoga*). The list of three influxes (omitting the

We have a basic hierarchy of spiritual progress in terms of moral development, mental development and spiritual wisdom.³² Understandably, if one tries to develop wisdom (*paññā*), one first needs some measure of mental concentration (*samādhi*). If one tries to cultivate concentration, clearly one needs some measure of moral virtue.

What this means in practice is that it is understood that someone can have developed *sīla* but need not necessarily have developed *samādhi* and *paññā*; someone can have developed *sīla* and *samādhi*, but not necessarily have developed *paññā* to any great degree. However, the converse cannot be so. This is reflected in the corresponding hierarchy of religious goals. The development of *sīla* alone leads to a happy rebirth in the *kāma-loka*; the development of *sīla* and *samādhi* to rebirth in the *brahma-loka*; by developing *sīla*, *samādhi* and *paññā* rebirth in all kinds is transcended.

(Gethin 2001:209)

4.1.2.6 SYNERGISTIC PROGRESS. By the end of the Nikāya period (when the compilation of the four Nikāyas and the Sutta, nipāta were more or less fixed), if not earlier, this threefold system has been applied to the three stages of the noble path.³³ LS Cousins, in his article, “Samatha-yāna and Vipassanā-yāna” (1984), adds this helpful explanation related to the above remark:

This might be better expressed by saying that all *ariya* disciples have mastered the precepts; the never-returner has mastered both *sīla* and *samādhi*; while the arahat has mastered wisdom as well. This corresponds quite closely to the structure of the Buddhist cosmos. One is reborn as a deva through generosity and keeping the precepts, as a brahma through developing *samādhi* and in the Pure Abodes by developing wisdom. Quite logically all brahmas are also devas but not vice versa, while all those resident in the Pure Abodes are both devas and brahmas.

This may be termed the *vertical structure* of the path. An alternative view becomes very important in the Abhidhamma. The whole of the path is seen as arising together in unity at the moment of attainment. This we will call the *horizontal structure*. It is applied, for example, to the *bodhi-pakkhiya-dhammas* in relation to each of the four paths (*magga*). On a lesser level it is applied to the five faculties (*indriya*) in relation to *jhāna*. (LS Cousins, 1984:57)

While the sliding hierarchy of the threefold training forms a neat theory, the reality of practice is rather subtle.³⁴ In fact, moral virtue, concentration and wisdom are inextricably bound together. This means that the spiritual beginner should not only establish himself in moral virtue, but should also at least cultivate some level of concentration and wisdom, and the adept at the advanced stages of the path, accomplished in wisdom, nevertheless needs moral virtue and concentration. This is clearly reflected in Soṇadaṇḍa’s words to the Buddha who approves of them:³⁵

Just as, Gotama, one might wash hand with hand or foot with foot; even so, wisdom is fully cleansed by moral virtue, moral virtue is fully cleansed by wisdom. Where there is moral virtue, there is wisdom; where there is wisdom, there is moral virtue. The morally virtuous has wisdom; the wise has moral virtue. Moral virtue and wisdom are declared the summit of the world.

(D 4.21/1:124)

influx of views) [S43] is probably older and is found more frequently in the suttas (D 3:216, 33.1.10(20); M 1:55, 3:41; A 3.59, 67, 6.63). The destruction of these *āsava*s is equivalent to arhathood. See BDict: āsava.

³² See eg Subha S (M 99/2:196-209) and Kassapa Sīhanāda S = Mahā Sīhanāda S (D 8).

³³ A 1:231-235, 4:380 f; Pug 37; cf A 2:136.

³⁴ A number of scholars have pointed this out: H Saddhātissa, *Buddhist Ethics*, London, 1970:68; R Gombrich, “Notes on the brahminical background to Buddhist ethics” in G Dhammapala, *Buddhist Studies in honour of Hammalava Saddhatissa*, 1984:91-102; and R Gethin, *The Buddhist Path to Awakening*, 2001:209-212.

³⁵ In Soṇadaṇḍa S (D 4), the stages of the path are considered only as *sīla* and *paññā*. Implicit here is that these two in themselves conduce to the cultivation of moral virtue.

In terms of actual practice, the noble eightfold path formula is always given as *sīla-samādhī-pañña*, as stated in the Cūḷa Vedalla Sutta (M 44), where the nun Dhammadinnā explains to the layman Visākha, thus:

The three aggregates³⁶ [threefold training] are not included by the noble eightfold path, friend Visākha, but the noble eightfold path is included by the three aggregates. Right speech, right action, and right livelihood: these states are included in the aggregate of moral virtue. Right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration: these states are included in the aggregate of concentration. Right view and right thought: these states are included in the aggregate of wisdom.
(M 44.11/1:301)

The noble eightfold path therefore does not comprise successful stages like a three-rung ladder nor even milestones or signboards along the way. They constitute *a path*, not in a linear progression from start to finish; rather, “they embody a complete ‘way of going along’ or ‘mode of practice’—a way (*paṭipadā*) The eight factors embrace all that is essential to spiritual progress” (Gethin 2001:212). This does not mean that the awakening is sudden, but rather that all the various factors, operating together as aggregates, are understood and refined *altogether* by way of theory, practice and realization.

4.1.2.7 CHINESE DUALISM. Not only did the Chinese Buddhists generally reject the gradual way of early Buddhism, they were unable to accommodate the central teaching of not-self (*anattā*). But before we discuss why the traditional Chinese Buddhists could not let go of the notion of a permanent soul, let us examine some psychological background of ancient Chinese society. In simple terms, it has to do with Daoist philosophical influence on the early Chinese Buddhists that provoked the debate on “gradual awakening” (*jiānwù* 漸悟) versus “sudden awakening” (*dùnwù* 頓悟). [2.2.3; 5.3.1]

Daoist philosophy in particular, and Chinese society in general, tend to think in terms of duality—*yīn* 陰 and *yáng* 陽 [1.3.2.2]—the need to harmonize between opposite qualities and states. The need for harmonizing the polarities is because *they are originally or fundamentally one*: this is the natural state of thing (*zìrán* 自然)—Daoist naturalness, spontaneity, or Buddhist suchness—and the true person “attains to a natural awakening” (*chéngzìránjué* 成自然覺). The fullest statement on this philosophy is that by Dào-shēng 道生 in his preface to *Dà bānnièpán jīng jíjiě* 大般涅槃經集解, “Exegetical Anthology on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra,” commenting on the revision of Dharma, kṣema’s translation of the 大般涅槃經集解 *Dà bānnièpán jīng* by Huiguan and others [4.1.1]—where before his death in 434, he states:

道生曰。	<i>Dào shēng yuē</i>	Dào shēng said:
夫真理自然。	<i>fū zhēnlǐ zìrán</i>	The truth is naturalness (<i>zìrán</i> 自然).
悟亦冥符。	<i>wù yì míng fú</i>	Awakening is when one is in profound harmony.
真則無差。	<i>zhēn zé wú chà</i>	Since the truth is without difference,
悟豈容易。	<i>wù qǐ róngyì</i>	isn’t awakening easy?
不易之體。	<i>bùyì zhī tǐ</i>	The unchanging essence
為湛然常照。	<i>wéi zhàn rán cháng zhào</i>	is always lucid and radiant;
但從迷乖之。	<i>dàn cóng mí guāi zhī</i>	but obscured by delusion,
事未在我耳。	<i>shì wèi zài wǒ ěr</i>	it seems to be out of reach.

(T37.1763.377b10-12)³⁷

Since truth is one and indivisible, Dào shēng thought, it follows that awakening must also occur “at once,” that is, not in progressive stages. Moreover, as the permanent essence lies within man, it must be identical with Buddha-nature [4.2].³⁸

³⁶ Here, “aggregates” (*khandha*) is simply collective term, referring to the components of each state of the threefold training.

³⁷ For a full tr and analysis of Dào shēng, see Whalen Lai, “The *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and its earliest interpreters in China,” 1982: 99-103. The above tr differs significantly from Lai’s tr (1982: 173).

³⁸ See Whalen Lai 1987a:173 f.

It helps to state at this point that early Mahāyāna is characterized by a profound development in Buddhist philosophy and religious speculation, reaching its apex with the aptly-named Perfection of Wisdom (*prajñā, pāramitā*) sutras that flourished during the first 500 years CE. This philosophical tradition continued in China in the 5th century, reaching its peak in the 8th century, as we shall see in the next chapter [5]. It was an exciting period of questioning, searching and innovating—the more they questioned, searched and innovated in their Buddhist quest, the more uniquely Chinese that Buddhism became.

For example, the ancient Chinese Buddhists went on to ask whether there could be *further* awakening. The arhat might know that he is liberated, but he has not attained the full range of Buddha's wisdom. Such questions understandably would interest the status-conscious and hierarchy-minded Chinese Buddhist, deeply and subtly influenced by Confucian social ethics. The philosophical and religious ambience was further compounded by the Chinese grasp of the eternal unchanging essence, the soul.

What the ancient Chinese Buddhists misunderstood or rejected was the notion of not-self or no-soul (*anattā*). Any serious student or practitioner of early Buddhism knows that awakening involves the direct seeing of *anattā*, which is the same as experiencing nirvana, as far as language goes. To accommodate Daoist monism, they effectively rejected the Indian teaching of *wúwǒ* 無我 and replaced it with the Daoist ideal of *wuwei* 無為 [5.2.4.2].

4.1.2.8 AWAKENING IS ONE AND THE SAME. There may be a difference in the level of wisdom between the Buddha and his followers (*anubuddha*), disciples (*sāvaka*), or arhats, and the individual Buddhas (*pacceka, buddha*),³⁹ it has nothing to do with the *status* of liberation, but with the *skill* in teaching the Dharma and helping others. The whole notion of a Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna duality, in this vein, is a suspiciously triumphalist one with the Mahāyāna caught in the rut of superiority conceit (*atimāna*).⁴⁰

Nowhere in the early Canon does the Buddha ever speak of an heirarchy of awakening in the manner that the Mahayanists categorized full self-awakening (*samyak sambodhi*), individual awakening (*pratyeka bodhi*) and the disciple's awakening (*sāvaka bodhi*). On the contrary, the Buddha speaks of a *commonality, even identity, of awakening*, whether of the Buddha, the arhat or the pratyeka-buddha. Their difference is *not* one of quality, but of skillful means and circumstance. The Buddha arises in the right place at the right time; the path disciples arise after the Buddha, while the pratyeka-buddhas arise on their own.

In the (Mahānāma) Gilayāna Sutta (S 55.54), for example, the Buddha declares how the awakening of even a lay follower as being no different from that of a monk's:

If he says thus, 'My mind has turned away from the Brahmā world and is directed to the cessation of self-identity,'—then, Mahānāma, there is no difference between a lay follower who is thus liberated in mind and a monk who has been liberated in mind for a hundred years, that is, there is no difference between the one liberation and the other." (S 55.54.19/4:410) = SD 4.10

The Sappurisa Sutta (M 113) goes on admonish us against looking up to a renunciants on account of *charisma*, that is, social status, or his learning or expertise, or even his religious practice. Furthermore, the practitioner is admonished not to feel conceited about his own attainment of the form dhyanas, or the formless dhyanas, but instead *not to identify* with any of them, that is, to practise *atammayatā* (non-identification) towards them. And by the time he attains the level of the cessation of perception and feeling (*saññā, vedayita, nirodha*), his inflows (*āsava*) are exterminated: "he does not conceive *anything*, does not conceive *about* anything, and does not conceive *in any way*" (*na kiñci maññati, na kuhiñci maññati, na kenaci maññati*).⁴¹

³⁹ The pratyeka-buddha is similar to fully self-awakened Buddha in that they both attain nirvāṇa without any the help of anyone. However, the pratyeka-buddhas do not teach the Dharma as effectively as the fully-self-awakened Buddha. They also do not form a sangha of monastics to carry on the teaching. The pratyeka-buddha does not figure significantly in the early Canon, but through the Jain and later influence, he appears in Commentarial stories. See Ria Kloppenborg, *The Paccekabuddha: A Buddhist Ascetic*, Leiden: Brill, 1974.

⁴⁰ See Me: The Nature of conceit = SD 19.2a esp §6.1.

⁴¹ M 113.29/3:45 = SD 23.7.

By the time Buddhism began filtering into China, Buddhism had become a highly philosophized and academic system, championed by great philosophers and doctors of the church. On the flipside of this intellectual development was *the dark side of Buddhism*: Tantra or esoteric Buddhism. Both of these new forms of Buddhism were highly attractive to the ancient Chinese. Yet they also had to contend with the Daoists, the Confucianists and the imperial court.

Most of the early Chinese monks, especially the urban or metropolitan monks, were themselves nobles or gentry, and remained so even after their renunciation [2.3.3.2]. The gentry monks had a significant advantage in a feudal society that was hierarchical and chauvinistic. If the dark side of Theravada is the dogmatism of the Abhidhamma physical and mental categories, the dark side of Chinese Buddhism is the stratification of religious categories and status.

4.1.2.9 KUMĀRA,JĪVA AND THE THREE VEHICLES. In historical terms, the gradual awakening versus sudden awakening debate in Chinese Buddhism can be said to have begun with Kumāra,jīva's translation of the Lotus Sutra (406).⁴² In his prologue to the translation, Sēngrui 僧叡 (352-436), one of Kumāra,-jīva's chief scribes, states that, on account of the translation, for the first time, the meaning of the True Dharma was revealed: Kumāra,jīva had set the Mahāyāna standards of faith for posterity. He also started the fire for the debate between gradual and sudden awakening that raged in the generations to come.

Of course, he was only one of the *conditions*, not the cause, of the debate. As Whalen Lai notes, “Before Kumārajīva explained the implication of the one vehicle doctrine of the *Lotus Sūtra*, there was no cause even for Tao-sheng [Dàooshēng] to have argued for one homogeneous and progress-free enlightenment.” (1987: 179). Kumāra,jīva invoked the parable of the prodigal son (Lotus Sutra, ch 4) to support his idea: the prodigal son is the Hīnayāna disciple (*śrāvaka*), who is gently told that he is heir to the wealth of his father (the Buddha), whom he failed to recognize and whose wealth he had dared not enjoy before.

Before Kumāra,jīva, in India, the bodhisattva doctrine was rooted in the six perfections (*pāramitā*)—giving (*dāna*), moral virtue (*śīla*), patience (*kṣānti*), effort (*vīrya*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and wisdom (*prajñā*)—a list which was mentioned by Dhammapāla, commenting that this list is equivalent to the ten perfections (*pāramī*) of the Pali tradition.⁴³ In due course, the six perfections grew into ten. The knowledge of emptiness at the sixth stage was surpassed by the tenth stage, that of the perfection of knowledge (*jñāna,pāramitā*). The eighth stage⁴⁴ was the point of departure between the Hīnayāna arhat and the Mahāyāna bodhisattva.

By the time of Dàooshēng, the Chinese Mahāyāna interpreted the stages of progress in terms of the ten-stage grounds (*bhūmi*) as proposed in the Daśa,bhūmika Sūtra.⁴⁵ Even before Dàooshēng, Zhīdùn (Dàoólín) 止頓 (道林) (314-366) had already used the ten-stage model to distinguish the Hinayanist (whose liberation from samsara is relegated to the sixth stage) from the Mahayanist (who wins nirvana at the seventh stage). It is at this latter stage, too, that the bodhisattva gains “the acceptance of the state of non-arising” (*anutpatti.dharma,kṣānti*), a novel Mahāyāna idea defining awakening as the recognition of the non-arising of all realities, where samsara and nirvana are seen to be non-dual, without neither arising nor

⁴² T262.9.1c-62b, 7 fasc. The *Miàofǎ liánhuā jīng* 妙法蓮華經 or Lotus Sutra was first translated in Chinese by Dharma,rakṣa as the *Zhèng fǎhuā jīng* 正法華經 (T 263.9.63-133, 27 fasc) around 209. However, Kumāra,jīva (an erstwhile Parthian prince) was one of the most influential monks in Chinese Buddhist history.

⁴³ The 10 perfections are: giving (*dāna*), moral virtue (*śīla*), renunciation (*nekkhamma*), wisdom (*paññā*), effort (*virīya*), patience (*khantī*), truth (*sacca*), determination (*adhiṭṭhāna*), lovingkindness (*mettā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*). No such list, however, is found in the Canon. For Dhammapāla's remark (which shows that the 10 perfections model is later), see Bodhi (tr), *The All-Embracing Net of Views*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1978:314. For a tr of Dhammapāla's comy, see <http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/wheel409.html>.

⁴⁴ In a more primitive model, the full-fledged bodhisattva arises at the 7th stage, and the arhat relegated to the 6th, but in the revised tenfold model, the break was pushed to the 8th level.

⁴⁵ *Shízhù jīng* 十住經 (T286, 4 fasc), tr Kumārajīva (d 413); *Shìdì jīng* 十地經 (T 287.10.535a-573, 9 fasc), tr Śīla,dharma (Shīluó dāmó 尸羅達摩) & Dharma,rakṣa (Zhú fǎhù 竺法護 8th cent).

passing of dharmas.⁴⁶ The ancient Chinese saw this in Daoist terms as the “simultaneous perception of being and non-being” (*yǒu wú xiāngguān* 有無相觀).⁴⁷

Kumāra,jīva had his own understanding of the ten-stage model in his categorization of the three vehicles. In his correspondence with Huiyuǎn (403), Kumāra,jīva regarded *the three vehicles* as sharing a common career up to the seventh stage. The eighth stage was the cut-off point, where *the bodhisattva* was found. *The pratyeka-buddha* occupied the ninth stage, and *the Buddha* the tenth.⁴⁸ Although Kumāra,-jīva’s model was very similar to Zhīdùn’s [6.4.3], the commentators attributed it to the former on account of his status: Kumāra,jīva was a “major subitists,” while the latter was a “minor subitist.” Dàoshēng, however, was more dramatic: he eliminated all the stages and took awakening to be attained in one fell swoop!

4.1.2.10 CROSS-PURPOSES. Kumāra,jīva, in his correspondence with Dàoshēng, was cautious and noncommittal, because the former’s concern was to differentiate Mahāyāna non-duality from the Hindu belief in a single, universal entity (or eternal soul), by showing how the Buddhist notion of the non-dual (*advāya*) does not entail reducing everything to the one single cause. But Dàoshēng made that very same declaration:

既悟其一	<i>jì wù qí yī</i>	Since to be awakened is to be one,
則眾事皆得。	<i>zé zhòngshì jiē dé</i>	then all affairs can be settled;
故一為眾	<i>gù yī wéi zhòng</i>	therefore, the one serves as the many,
事之所由也。	<i>shì zhī suǒ yóu yě</i>	which is the cause of all things, too. (T38.396c)

Dàoshēng did not care about the Buddhist-Hindu debates. His aim was simply to make sure that Buddhist non-duality fitted in with the neo-Daoist principle of the one.⁴⁹

Gradualism was not totally rejected, not at first anyway. It was defended by **Huìguān** 慧觀 [4.1.1], who advocated the gradualism of the three vehicles, and it did become the majority opinion of his time, but gave way to a new wave of subitist thinking in the late 6th century, and reached its apex in 8th-century Chán. Only fragments of Huìguān’s once influential thesis are extant.

4.1.2.11 SĒNGZHÀO. An even stronger defence of gradualism was put up by **Sēngzhào** 僧肇 (384-414),⁵⁰ Kumāra,jīva’s first disciple and master of emptiness philosophy, in his 413 essay entitled *Nièpán wúmíng lùn* 涅槃無名論 (“Nirvana is nameless”).⁵¹ Sēngzhào gives various interesting imageries in defence of the gradual modes of spiritual progress. The most famous is perhaps his parable of the three river-crossing animals: three animals—a rabbit, a horse and an elephant—cross a river. *The rabbit* (the disciple, *śrāvaka*) swims across without touching the river-bed—his wisdom is the shallowest; *the horse* (the pratyeka-buddha) swims across, occasionally touching the river-bed—his wisdom is deeper. *The elephant* (the bodhisattva) is the slowest, but he walks across the river touching the river-bed all the time—his wisdom is the most profound. This parable illustrates how even though the far shore (nirvana) is the same, the depth of understanding of the three vehicles differ. (T45.159c)⁵²

4.1.2.12 XIÈ LÍNGYÜN. About a decade after Sēngzhào (422-423), the extraordinary but tragic Xiè Língyùn 謝靈運 (385-433) [4.1.1] defended Dàoshēng’s subitism in his *Biànzōng lùn* 辯宗論 (“Debates on Essentials”) (T52.228a75). His defence is mainly philosophical, but he makes an interesting and insightful thesis that *gradual awakening* is an Indian trait while *sudden enlightenment* is Chinese by nature:

⁴⁶ For an extensive discussion on *anutpatti.dharma,kṣānti*, see Genjun H Sasaki, *Linguistic Approach to Buddhist Thought*, 1986: 133-154 (ch 7).

⁴⁷ See Whalen Lai 1987a: 179.

⁴⁸ See Leon Hurvitz, “*Daijō daigishō ni okeru ichijō sanjō no mondu ni tsuite*,” in Kimura E’ichi et al (eds), *Eon kenkyū 2*, Kyoto: Kyōtō daigaku jinbun kagaku kenkyūjo, 1962: 169-193.

⁴⁹ See Whalen Lai 1987a: 186.

⁵⁰ See <http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/Sēngzhào.htm>.

⁵¹ T45.1858.157a12-b26. For tr see CHANG Chung-Yuan, “Nirvana is Nameless,” 1974.

⁵² See W Liebenthal, *Chao Lun: The Treatises of Seng-chao*, 1968 & Whalen Lai 1987a: 187-190.

華人易於見理。 難於受教。 故閉其累學 而開其一極。 夷人易於受教。 難於見理 故閉其頓了 而開其漸悟。	<i>huárén yì yú jiàn lǐ nán yú shòujiào gù bì qí lěi xué ér kāi qí yī jí yí rén yì yú shòujiào nán yú jiàn lǐ gù bì qí dùn liǎo ér kāi qí jiànwù</i>	The Chinese find it easy to see the truth but difficult to receive instruction, so they are closed to repeated learning, but open to the one ultimate. Barbarians find it easy to receive instructions but difficult to see the truth— so they are closed to sudden understanding, but are open to gradual awakening. (T52.2103.225a26-28)
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Xiè's remarks here ring an almost chauvinistic tone—that the Chinese were hard to teach but quick to realize the ultimate truth by themselves. Foreigners, on the other hand, are more open to new learning or even gullible, but are slow in realizing the ultimate truth. It is significant here that Xiè implicitly admits that *the subitist position had little or no basis in early Indian Buddhism*. Xiè's bias is understandable: he was a Chinese nobleman, nature poet, and a Daoist convert to Buddhism, more inspired by Chinese aesthetics and learning than by Buddhist spirituality. He was a man of letters.

This brings us to another interesting characteristic of Chinese Buddhism, which is, that it was and is very much *logocentric*,⁵³ word-based, and *bibliocentric*, book-based.⁵⁴ A case in point, as we shall see below [4.2.1], is how **the Nirvāṇa Sūtra** (*Nihuan jing* 泥洹經) [4.1.1] played a decisive role in the “gradual-sudden” debate. Dào shēng declared that everyone, including the *icchantika* (incorrigible beings lacking the requisites for achieving awakening), have Buddha-nature. The newly-translated shorter Nirvāṇa Sūtra said otherwise, and Huiguān 慧觀 had Dào shēng exiled from Cháng'ān. Later, when Dharmakṣema's translation of the complete Nirvāṇa Sūtra appeared, it *reversed* its own view, and Dào shēng was vindicated! [4.2.1]

4.1.3 Mind and self in Chinese Buddhism

4.1.3.1 THE ETERNAL “SOUL.” The Chinese held the notion of an eternal soul since ancient times, an idea which is often very close to that of the brahmanical *atmān* or *Brahman*. The famous German Indologist, Paul Hacker (1913-1947), has characterized Ādi Śaṅkara's⁵⁵ notion of the self as the *lumen intellectuale* (“intellectual light”),⁵⁶ and, which, Whalen Lai notes, corresponds to **Zhuāngzi's** notion of the absolute, vacuous, mysteriously alert, self-knowing mind. The direct parallel to Śaṅkara's *ātman*, would be the Chinese notion of *shénmíng* 神明 (the luminous and awakened spirit) used by **emperor Wǔ of Liáng** (464-549) [1.2.4], a member of the Nirvāṇa school.⁵⁷ *Shénmíng* is, in fact, an ancient Daoist term for a luminous psyche (mind, spirit, or soul).⁵⁸

One of the last significant efforts to clear the Chinese mind of the eternal-soul idea was made by **Kumārajīva** in the late 6th century [4.1.2.4]. He took pains to differentiate Mahāyāna non-duality from the Hindu monistic belief in a single, universal entity or eternal universal soul by showing how the Buddhist notion of the non-dual (*advāya*) does not entail reducing everything to the one single cause. Apparently, he failed to convince his Chinese audience.

4.1.3.2 THE EIGHT CONSCIOUSNESSES. Another magnificent last-ditch effort against the soul-view was made by Xuánzàng 玄奘 (600-644), as part of his teachings of “mere consciousness” (*wéishí* 唯識) or

⁵³ The word is *not* used as a tt here. As a tt, it refers to a structuralist method of analysis, especially of literary works, that focuses upon words and language to the exclusion of non-linguistic matters, such as an author's individuality or historical context—although this def may reflect *some* of the Chinese Buddhist attitude *sometimes*.

⁵⁴ On book-based and truth-based religion, see **Koṭṭhika S** (S 35.232) = SD 28.4.

⁵⁵ Ādi Śaṅkara (8th century) was the first Indian philosopher to consolidate Advaita Vedanta. His teachings are centred around the unity of the self (*ātman*) and Brahma, which is regarded as without attributes. His clever polemics against Buddhism was one of the factors in reducing the influence of Buddhism in India in due course. See also Ingalls 1954.

⁵⁷ Lai 1977:79.

⁵⁸ See Pachow 1980: 117-162 (ch 8).

“Dharma characteristics” (*fǎxiàng* 法相). Xuánzàng’s main interest was Yogâcâra (Vijñâna, *vāda*)⁵⁹ philosophy, and with his disciple Kuījī 窺基 (632-682),⁶⁰ were responsible for the formation of the *wéishí* 唯識 or “mere consciousness” school in China.⁶¹

The “mere consciousness” doctrine is given in Xuánzàng’s *Chéng wéishí lùn* 成唯識論,⁶² a translation of the essential Yogâcâra writings, and in Kuījī’s commentary.⁶³ The main thesis of this school is that *the whole world is but a representation of the mind*.

A key concept of Yogâcâra philosophy is the concept of the storehouse consciousness (*ālaya, vijñāna*)⁶⁴ as the most basic consciousness. In its analysis of the human mind, Yogâcâra teaches that beyond the five senses (or five consciousnesses), are the still deeper consciousnesses of: (6) the mind (or mental centre), (7) the ego-consciousness and (8) the eighth and last, the storehouse consciousness. The mind collects and integrates the separate impressions received by the five senses and produces what amounts to a mental image perceived as an entity.⁶⁵

According to the doctrine of the eight consciousnesses (*bāshí* 八識, Skt *aṣṭa, vijñāna*), the minds of sentient beings comprise of eight distinguishable types of consciousness, which can be spoken of as being four general types:⁶⁶

- (1) The first five consciousnesses (**pañca vijñāna*) or *wǔshí* 五識 correspond to the respective sense perceptions. These five, which operate based on the five faculties (*wǔgēn* 五根; Skt *pañc'indriya*) and their five objects (*wǔchén* 五塵), are standard teachings in early Indian Buddhism. Later, Yogâcâra scholars point out that they only function in a conscious state, ceasing in during periods of unconsciousness, and they can only function in conjunction with their specific objects, such as colour, smell, taste, etc.
- (2) The sixth consciousness (*mano, vijñāna*, “mind-consciousness”) or *yìshí* 意識, and is the thinking aspect of consciousness, which plays many roles, including sensory perceptions, value judgments, calculation, emotion, and intention. Unlike the first five consciousnesses, which only perceive the present, it can also perceive the past and future. As its objects, it takes language constructs and perceptual images, called *fǎ* 法 (*dharma*). Like the previous five consciousnesses, it operates both during waking consciousness, but also during shallow (dreaming) sleep.

⁵⁹ *Yúqíxíng pài* 瑜伽行派.

⁶⁰ See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?7a.xml+id\('b7aba-57fa'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?7a.xml+id('b7aba-57fa')).

⁶¹ See <http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara/thinkers/xuanzang-bio-uni.htm>.

⁶² “Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Mere Consciousness” (*Vijñapti, mātratā, siddhi Śāstra*), T1585.31.2a13.

⁶³ *Cheng weishi lun* (T1585.31.1a-59a, 10 fasc). Mainly tr Xuánzàng 玄奘 of Dharmapāla’s (Hūfǎ 護法) comy on *Thirty Verses on Consciousness-only* (*Wéishí sānshí sòng* 唯識三十頌) by Vasubandhu (*Shiqīn* 世親), but it also incl edited trs of other masters’ works on the same verses. It is the primary text of the *Fǎxiàng* 法相 school. On Kuījī’s 窺基 linkage of this text with Dharmapāla is problematic, see Lusthaus’ *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 2002: ch 15. This is the only work by Xuánzàng that is not a direct tr of a text, but instead a selective, evaluative editorial, drawing on several (traditionally ten) distinct texts. Since Kuījī aligned himself with this text while assuming the role of Xuánzàng’s successor, the East Asian tradition has treated the *Chéng wéishí lùn* as the pivotal exemplar of Xuánzàng’s teachings. Vallée Poussin’s French tr incorporates material from the Saeki ed and the comys by Kuījī while embedding his reading in a heavily idealistic interpretation. The Eng rendering by Wei Tat of Vallée Poussin’s tr omits most of Vallée Poussin’s extensive explanatory notes. Refs: Frances H Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-only*. Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999; Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology*, 2002. Swati Ganguly (*Treatise in Thirty Verses on Mere Consciousness*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992) offers an abr ver of the *Cheng weishi lun*. See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?62.xml+id\('b6210-552f-8b58-8ad6'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?62.xml+id('b6210-552f-8b58-8ad6')).

⁶⁴ *Ālāiyé shí* 阿賴耶識 or *suōzhī yī* 所知依, “the basis of the known,” from which other consciousnesses arise.

⁶⁵ See <http://www.iep.utm.edu/x/Xuanzang.htm>.

⁶⁶ See AC Muller’s “Digital Dictionary of Buddhism,” [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?51.xml+id\('b516b-8b58'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?51.xml+id('b516b-8b58')).

- (3) The seventh consciousness (*kliṣṭa, mano, vijñāna*, “defiled mind-consciousness”), often simply referred to as *manas* (“the mind”) or *mònàshí* 末那識,⁶⁷ is hypothesized as the origin of the sense of a self, which it develops based on perceiving the apparent continuity of sameness exhibited by the sense-base consciousness. It functions as a simple, fundamental perception of the *ālaya* (the “store”) within, analyzing the relative benefit or harm to the self arising from external objects and states. Thus, it is characterized in the *Chéng wéishì lùn* as “continually examining and assessing” (*héng shěn siliang* 恆審思量). It is considered as the cause of all selfish tendencies, and therefore of all illusions arising from assuming the apparent as the real. The seventh is also defined in some texts as the *ādāna* (*ātuónà shí* 阿陀那識) or “grasping consciousness,” reflecting its nature.
- (4) The eighth consciousness, *ālaya, vijñāna* (*ālàyé shí* 阿賴耶識) is understood as being the most fundamental aspect of consciousness, functioning as the repository of all the impressions from our experiences. As the first seven of these arise based on the eighth, they are called the “evolving consciousnesses” (*zhuǎn shí* 轉識). In contrast, the eighth is known as the “base consciousness” (*běn shí* 本識), store consciousness (*zàngshí* 藏識), or seed consciousness (*zhǒngzǐ shí* 種子識)—this is the karmic aspect of consciousness (parallel to the *saṅkhāra* of early Buddhism). The eighth consciousness is understood to be the actual subject of transformation, which is, in non-Buddhist traditions, taken to be an eternal soul, or self (*wǒ* 我).

4.1.3.3 HUIYUǎN’S VIEW. However, Buddhism teaches that there is neither a permanent *subject* (or agent) called “I” nor a permanent *object* (or “thing”). The false conceptions of “I” and “Thou” or “It,” as if they are two entities arise from a deep mental source in the seventh consciousness or ego-consciousness. This ego-centre creates the false sense of subject and object, partly due to ignorance and partly due to habitual thinking, that is, *conceptual thinking*, inherited from past experiences (known as *latent tendencies*, *anusaya*, in early Buddhism). Finally, as a kind of reservoir repository into which all impressions and conceptions are deposited is the “storehouse consciousness” (*ālaya, vijñāna*), the most fundamental consciousness, a sort of subconscious or “existential consciousness.”⁶⁸

The famous Chán master, **Huiyuǎn** 慧遠 (334-316)⁶⁹ [3.4.4.4], however, identified the “true mind” with the “true consciousness.” His scheme was like this:

- The 5 senses = *shí* 識, the deluded senses or consciousness.⁷⁰
 The 6th consciousness = *yì* 意, the deluded intention, and
 The 7th consciousness = *wàngxīn* 妄心, the deluded ego-consciousness (*ādāna, vijñāna*) or false mind,
 The 8th consciousness = *zhēnxīn* 真心, the “true mind” (ie *ālaya, vijñāna*),

This was, of course, Huiyuǎn’s personal interpretation.⁷¹ In fact, the standard view takes the eighth consciousness as *xīn* 心, “the mind” (Skt *citta*, for *ālaya, vijñāna*), the seventh as “intention,” *yì* 意 (*manas*) and the rest as consciousnesses, *shí* 識 (*vijñāna*).⁷² As Whalen Lai notes, “Hui-yuan, however, was a very influential thinker at the time, and his interpretation of the Hua-yen sūtra became the orthodox pronounce-

⁶⁷ In a private communication (email 4 Nov 08), Dan Lusthaus informs me that *yì* 意 when used alone should mean *manas*, and is interchangeable with 末那. I am unable to find the Chinese tt for *kliṣṭa, mano, vijñāna*, although there are a number of explanatory terms (such as 染心 *rǎnxīn*). The Chinese term *mònàshí* refers to the 7th consciousness, and should not be confounded with the sixth consciousness, *mano, vijñāna*.

⁶⁸ On “existential consciousness” and “cognitive consciousness,” see The Unconscious = SD 17.8b esp (3).

⁶⁹ See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?61.xml+id\('b6167-9060'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?61.xml+id('b6167-9060')).

⁷⁰ See Fukaura Seibun, *Yuishiki gaku kenkyū* (bu), Kyoto: Nagato Bunshodo, 1954 1:188-208.

⁷¹ **Huiyuǎn** defended the immortal soul view in his *Xingjīnshénbùmiè lùn* 形盡神不滅論, “On the indestructibility of the soul after the dissolution of the body” (T52.2102.29c19+31b10-32b-11). See Sēngyòu’s *Hóngmíngjí* 僧祐弘明集 (T52.2102.1-97) 5:65-67. This is the 5th essay incl under the title “On why monks do not bow before kings” (*Shāmén bùjìng wángzhě* 沙門不敬王者). However, Huiyuǎn’s conception of “soul” is a Daoist eternal oneness rather than the brahminical *ātman*: see Ming-Wood LIU 1985.

⁷² Hakeda Yoshito (tr) *The Awakening of Faith Attributed to Asvaghosa*, NY: Columbia Univ Press, 1967: 47n.

ment: the Three Realms are solely created by the True Mind.”⁷³ Again, we see the teacher placed above the teaching, but the teacher holding a wrong view.

While Xuánzàng and Kuījī lived, their school achieved some degree of eminence and popularity, but with the passing of the two masters it rapidly declined. The reality of this situation is instructive: Xuánzàng and Kuījī were respected *ad hominen*—the teacher was placed above his work, or perhaps due to Xuánzàng’s acumen and thoroughness, no one could rebut his teachings. But with the master’s passing, the howling began.

4.1.3.4 EARLY BUDDHIST TEACHING ON *CITTA*. Early Buddhism has a clear stand on the term *citta*, one of the most important terms in Buddhist psychology. In the Assutava Sutta 1 (S 12.61), the Buddha speaks of “‘mentation’ [thought] (*citta*), or ‘mind’ (*mano*), or ‘consciousness’ (*viññāṇa*)” (*cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇam iti pi*) as if they are synonyms.⁷⁴ The Saṃyutta Commentary, in fact, says that all these are names for the mind-base (*man’āyatana*) (SA 2:98). Where the general sense of “mind” is intended (as in the Assutavā Sutta 1), we see that the three terms are often used interchangeably in the Suttas.⁷⁵ However, although these three terms have the same meaning, as noted by Bhikkhu Bodhi, in his translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya,

in the Nikāyas they are generally used in distinct contexts. As a rough generalization, *viññāṇa* signifies the particularizing awareness through which a sense faculty (as in the standard sixfold division of *viññāṇa* into eye-consciousness, etc) as well as the underlying stream of consciousness, which sustains personal continuity through a single life and thread together successive lives (emphasized at S 12.38-40).⁷⁶ *Mano* serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (*dhammā*), its own special class of objects. *Citta* signifies mind as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition and emotion. It is the *citta* that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. (S:B 769 n154)⁷⁷

Bodhi uses “mentality” for *mano*.⁷⁸ However, here I am influenced by the Buddhist Dictionary definition of *citta*, where *adhicitta* = “higher mentality.” Moreover, as Bodhi himself adds:

Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomena (*dhammā*), its own special class of objects. (id)

As such, “mentation” (a function) is clearly a better translation of *mano* than “mentality” (more of a state). This is just a bit of pedantry probably limited to this passage. In fact, the simple word “thought,” well translates *citta* here, too. Elsewhere, it is best (as Bodhi himself admits) to translate *citta* and *mano* as “mind,” as most translators now do, too. The point is to be aware of the right context.

There are, evidently, in early Buddhism, hints at slightly different emphases on different aspects of the mind as the context demands, but there is no dynamic hierarchy as found in the theory of the eight consciousnesses in Yogācāra. However, even in non-Mahāyāna schools, in their Abhidharmas and later philosophical developments, the mind is later distinguished as *citta* and regarded as the cognitive ground upon which the *cetasika* (P *cetasika*, mental factors) function.⁷⁹

⁷³ See Whalen Lai, “The meaning of ‘mind-only’ (*wei-hsin*),” 1977: 69 f.

⁷⁴ S 12.61.47/2:94 f = SD 20.2. Cf **Brahma, jāla S** (D 1): *Yaṃ...idaṃ vuccati cittaṃ ti vā mano ti vā viññāṇan ti vā* (D 1.49/1:21,21).

⁷⁵ Eg D 1:21; S 2:94 f. See also Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford): *citta*.

⁷⁶ On the 2 kinds of consciousnesses, see **Cetanā S 1-3** (S 12.38-40/2:65-67) = SD 7.6a+b+6c.

⁷⁷ For a detailed discussion, see Hamilton 1996a: ch 5 & also *Viññāṇa* = SD 17.8a(12).

⁷⁸ S:B 595 & 769 n154.

⁷⁹ The later form is *caitta*, denoting the derivative mental states or functions of the mind. See BDict: *cetasika*; Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford): *caitta*, etc.

Later still, some Mahāyāna and Tantric authorities take *citta* as the equivalent of *bodhi, citta*, and hold that when the natural state of mind is obscured by the false dichotomy into a perceiving *subject* and perceived *objects*, the everyday mind, which is a fragmentation of its natural state, arises. The Mahāyāna, especially the Chan, speak of seeing the “oneness” of the mind. [5.2.4.6]

4.2 BUDDHA-NATURE AND *TATHĀGATA, GARBHA*

4.2.1 Buddha-nature.⁸⁰ In 418, Fǎxiǎn 法顯 (the first Chinese monk successfully to return to China with scriptures from pilgrimage to India) and Buddha, bhadra produced a partial translation of the Mahāyāna *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*. One of the topics it discusses is the *icchantika* (*yīchǎntí* 一闍提), that is, incorrigibly opinionated beings lacking the requisites for achieving awakening. [4.3.2]

Dào shēng 道生 (c360-434), a disciple of Huiyuǎn, convinced that all beings, including *icchantikas*, must possess Buddha-nature and hence are capable of awakening, insisted that the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* be understood in that light. Since that violated the obvious meaning of the text, Dào shēng was unanimously rebuked, whereupon he left the capital in disgrace. In 421, a new translation by Dharma, kṣema of the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra*, based on a Central Asian original, appeared containing sections absent from the previous version. The 23rd chapter of Dharma, kṣema’s version contained passages declaring that Buddha-nature was indeed universal, and that even *icchantikas* possessed it and could thus reach the goal. Dào shēng’s detractors in the capital were humbled and suddenly impressed at his prescience. [4.3.1]

The lesson was never forgotten, so that two centuries later, when Xuánzàng (600–664) translated Indian texts that once again declared that *icchantikas* lacked the requisite qualities to attain awakening, his school was attacked from all quarters as promoting a less than ‘Mahāyānic’ doctrine. However, it should be noted that there is no clear precedent or term in Indian Buddhism for “Buddha-nature.” The notion probably either arose in China through a certain degree of licence taken by translators when rendering terms like **buddhatva* (“Buddhahood,” an accomplishment, not a primordial ontological ground), or it developed from nascent forms of the theory possibly constructed in Central Asia. However, from then on, Buddha-nature became one of the foundational tenets of virtually all forms of East Asian Buddhism.

4.2.2 *Tathāgata, garbha*.

4.2.2.1 ETYMOLOGY. The Mahāyāna conception of Buddha-nature is closely connected, even taken by some as being identical, with another uniquely Mahāyāna notion, that of the *tathāgata, garbha* 如來藏 (*rúláizàng*),⁸¹ mentioned earlier in connection with the Lotus Sutra [2.8.2]. The term *tathāgata, garbha* is resolved into two Sanskrit words: *tathāgata* (*rúlái* 如來) is an epithet of the Buddha, meaning either “thus come” or “thus gone”; and *garbha* means embryo, womb or matrix, and was translated into Chinese as *zang* 藏, meaning “store, repository.” In its earliest appearances in Buddhist texts, *tathāgata, garbha* (repository of Buddhahood) signified the inherent capacity of humans (and sometimes other sentient beings) to achieve Buddhahood.

4.2.2.2 MAHĀYĀNA CONCEPTION OF TATHĀGATA, GARBHA. Both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna speak of the “radiant mind” (*P pabhassara, citta*; Skt *prabhāsvara, citta*), but after the Buddha’s passing, the Mahāyāna broadened the idea of the radiant mind to include the notion of liberation itself [2.2.6]. According to the Mahāyāna, since the radiant mind is present in everyone and every living being, it is also present in the Buddha. The concept of the radiant mind is especially of great importance in Mahāyāna. The Perfection of Wisdom in 8000 Lines (*Aṣṭa, sāhasrikā Prajñā, pāramitā*) (1st cent BCE-1st cent CE) identifies it with the “heart of awakening” (*bodhi, citta*),⁸² the compassion-motivated aspiration to attain Buddhahood

⁸⁰ This section is from Dan Lusthaus’ article at <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/G002SECT3>.

⁸¹ See Dan Lusthaus, “Indian transplants: *tathāgatagarbha* and *Yogācāra*,” in 1998. For other refs, see <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tathagatagarbha>.

⁸² *Uṣu* tr as “thought of awakening.” Thurman renders *bodhi, citta* as “spirit of enlightenment,” which is followed by Jan Nattier: “I have adopted Robert Thurman’s felicitous rendering of this term in place of the more common “thought of enlightenment,” since the latter suggests a (primarily) rational, verbal, and reflective commitment to enlightenment, which is not always the case in the texts I have examined” (*A Few Good Men*, 2003: 220 n 77).

for liberating all beings.⁸³ Here the link with compassion parallels the early Suttas' linking of lovingkindness with the radiant mind [5]. The early Suttas too connect awakening (*bodhi*) with the radiant mind: however, while the Mahāyāna link it with Buddhahood, the early Suttas connect it with arhathood, that is, when the radiance is "uncovered."

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (p77) identifies the radiant mind with the *tathāgata,garbha*, "the Buddha-embryo" or the awakening-potential, and says that it is "by nature radiant, pure, pure from the start" (*prakṛti,prabhāsvara,visuddhy'ādi,visuddhā*). It is "naturally pure but appears to be impure as it is defiled by the stains that arrive" and is "enveloped in the garments of personality-factors, (sensory) elements and sense-spheres, and soiled with the dirt of attachment, hatred, delusion and imagining (*parikalpa*)" (Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 222).⁸⁴

In the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the *tathāgata,garbha* is regarded as eternal and permanent in the sense that emptiness (*sūnyatā*) is eternal and permanent (p778). It further equates it with the *ālaya,vijñāna* or store-consciousness of Yogācāra thought.⁸⁵ This is a similar concept to that of the Theravādin *bhavaṅga citta*, both systems incorporating conception (*manas*) and the six forms of sense-consciousness (Harvey 1990: 107-109).

4.2.2.3 CHINESE CONCEPTION OF TATHĀGATA,GARBHA. In the Mahāyāna canon, there are complete discourses, such as the **Mahā,vaipulya Tathāgata,garbha Sūtra** (*Dà fāngděng rúláizàng jīng* 大方等如來藏經),⁸⁶ or simply, the Tathāgata,garbha Sūtra, serves as the foundational source for the *tathāgata,-garbha* theory. IT is a short text (only 1 fascicle) which, using a number of similes, tries to show the existence of an inherent potential for awakening (*bodhi*) in all being, but which lies hidden within each being. Apart from some Sanskrit fragments, the text survives only in Tibetan and Chinese translations.

In such discourse and teachings, the *tathāgata,garbha* is the original pristine pure ontological "Buddhahood," intrinsic in all things, a pure nature that is hidden away by defilements (*fānnāo* 煩惱; Skt *kleśa*), that is, mental, cognitive, psychological, moral and emotional obstructions. It was taken as a synonym for Buddha-nature (*fóxìng* 佛性) [2.2.3, 6.4.3], but it should be noted that Buddha-nature is usually understood in the context of one's innate ability to ultimately triumph in any struggle against defilements and impurities. In Chinese Buddhism, spiritual liberation is usually understood as a return to or uncovering of that Buddha-nature by destroying the defilements.

In their classical formulations, the *ālaya-vijñāna* and *tathāgata,garbha* were distinct items differing from each other in important ways—for instance, awakening entailed bringing the *ālaya-vijñāna* to an end, while it meant actualizing the *tathāgata,garbha*. The *ālaya-vijñāna* was the karmic mechanism itself, while *tathāgatagarbha* was in diametric opposition to all karmic defilements. However, some Buddhist texts, such as the **Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra**, conflated the two, arguing that the *ālaya-vijñāna*, like the *tathāgata,garbha*, was pure and its purity was permanently established after awakening.

They identified *tathāgatagarbha* with Buddha-nature and with the mind (*xīn* 心). The mind was regarded as being pure, eternal, and the ontological ground of reality (*dámótuódū* 達磨馱都, Skt *dharma,-dhātu*), while defiled thought-moments (*niàn* 念; Skt *kṣana*) that engaged in false discriminations had to be eliminated. Once *niàn* had been eliminated, the true, pure nature of the mind would radiantly shine forth, like the sun emerging from behind the clouds. Those opposing the *ālaya,vijñāna-tathāgata,garbha* conflation, however, held that the *ālaya,vijñāna* was itself defiled, and must be uprooted before one could awaken.

4.2.3 Can a robot have Buddha-nature? The notions of Buddha-womb (*tathāgata,garbha*) and Buddha-nature (**buddhatva*) have in recent decades caught the imagination of scientists and enthusiasts connected with robotics, over the possibility of eventually creating artificial intelligence. In the 1970s, the

⁸³ *Aṣṭa,sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtram*, ed PL Vaidya, Dharmabhaṅga: Mithila Institute, 1960:3; cf E Conze et al, *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*. NY & Evanston: Harper & Row, 1973: 84.

⁸⁴ Qu by W Rahula 1978: 98.

⁸⁵ See Harvey 1995: 161 f, 175 f, 217 f.

⁸⁶ Tr Buddhahadra (Fótuóbátuóluó 佛陀跋陀羅) in Cháng'ān, 406-407 (T666.16.457a-460b, 1 fasc); see also T667.16.460b-468a.

Japanese roboticist, Masahiro Mori (b 1927), noted for his pioneering work on the emotional response of humans to non-human entities, popularized the idea that robots, under certain conditions, may possess Buddha-nature. Mori has since founded an institute to study the metaphysical implications of such technology.⁸⁷

The implication or the question is, can a perfect simulation of intelligent outward behaviour really light the inner spark of a self-aware consciousness principle in an artificial entity? Given the doctrine of not-self, is there any difference between the subjective experiences of a robot that acts intelligent and an animal that is intelligent?

4.3 ICCHANTIKA

4.3.1 Can anyone become Buddha? Another religious idea unique to the Mahāyāna, transplanted into Chinese Buddhism, is that of the *icchantika* (*yīchǎntí* 一闍提),⁸⁸ that is, a person whose good karmic roots have been cut off on account of a morally depraved life [4.2.1]. In chapter 28 of the *Dà bānnièpán jīng* (Southern edition), the Buddha is recorded as declaring,

善男子。	<i>Shànnánzi</i>	“Good man!
一闍提者亦不決定。	<i>yīchǎntízhě yì bù juédìng</i>	The <i>icchantika</i> is not fixed [not immutable].
若決定者	<i>ruò juédìng zhě</i>	If it is fixed [immutable],
是一闍提終不能得	<i>shì yīchǎntí zhōng bùnéngdé</i>	a person could not gain
阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。	<i>ānòuduōluó sānmǎo sānpútí</i>	unsurpassed awakening.
以不決定是故能得。	<i>yǐ bùjuédìng shìgù néngdé</i>	As it is not fixed, he can indeed gain it.” ⁸⁹
(T12.374.493c24-26 北涼天竺三藏曇無讖譯 ⁹⁰ = T12.375.737a25-27 宋慧嚴等依泥洹經加之 ⁹¹)		

Generally understood, the *icchantika* is a person who is incapable of awakening to true reality. The notion of *icchantika* is probably best-known as a component of the “five-nature distinction” (*wǔxìng gèbié* 五性各別), a classification of propensities for awakening introduced by the Yogācāra, where it refers to a category of sentient beings who are deemed incapable of attaining nirvana. The existence of such a class of beings was denied by such schools as Tiāntái 天台 and Huáyán 華嚴 whose doctrines strongly advocated the possibility of Buddhahood for all sentient beings, a point discussed at length in “the Buddha-nature Treatise” (*Fóxìng lùn* 佛性論, *Buddhatva Śāstra, T31.1610).

The *icchantika*, according to some Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures, is the most base and spiritually deluded of all beings. The term implies that the being is given over to total hedonism and greed, but this is not a universal view [4.3.2]. In the *Tathagata, garbha* texts, some of which pay particular attention to the *icchantika*, the term frequently refers to those who do not believe in the Buddha, his eternal Selfhood and his Dharma, or in karma; who seriously transgress against the Vinaya and precepts; and who speak disparagingly and dismissively of the reality of the immortal Buddha-nature (**buddhatva*) or the *Tathāgata, garbha* being inherent in all beings (including *icchantika* themselves).

The two shortest versions of the Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra [4.1.1]—the first, the short (2-fascicle) *Dà bānnihuán jīng* 大般泥洹經—translated by Fāxiǎn (T376.12.853-899), and the other a middle-length Tibetan version—indicate that the *icchantika* has so totally severed all his roots of goodness that he can never attain nirvana [4.2.1]. The Dharma, kṣema’s full-length translation of *Dà bānnièpán jīng* 大般涅槃經 (the Mahā,parinirvāṇa Sūtra), on the other hand, states that even the *icchantika* can eventually find release into nirvana, since no phenomenon is fixed (including the *icchantika*), and that change for the better and the best is always a possibility. Other texts—such as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra—indicate that the

⁸⁷ See Masahiro Mori, *The Buddha in the Robot: a Robot Engineer’s Thoughts on Science and Religion*, Tokyo: Kosei, 1974. For other refs, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masahiro_Mori.

⁸⁸ Also transliterated as 一闍提迦 (*yīchǎntíjiā*), 一顛迦 (*yīdiānjiā*), 阿闍底迦 (*āchǎndǐjiā*).

⁸⁹ See also <http://www.nirvanasutra.org.uk/nirvanasutra.htm>.

⁹⁰ “Translated by by Dharma, kṣema of Northern Liang.”

⁹¹ “A revised Song edition by Huiyan and others based on the (Eastern Jin) *Ban niepan jīng*.”

icchantika will be saved through the saving power of the Buddha, who, it is claimed, will never abandon any being.

4.3.2 Origins of the *icchantika* notion. KARASHIMA Seishi has done a comprehensive study of “Who were the *icchantikas*?” (2007). He notes the existence of *icchatī* in Pali works, such as the *Visuddhi, magga*, where it means “fancies, maintains, holds, claims (a theory), etc.” He finds the term *icchantika* (glossing it as “one who makes claims, opinionated one”) appearing first in texts of the *tathāgata, -garbha* tradition. Furthermore, since the term does not appear in any non-Buddhist literature of this early period, claims by some scholars for interpreting the *icchantika* as a “hedonist” or “secularist” seem to be unfounded. Taking *icchantika* as “one who makes claims,” it is conceivable that, rather than being a group of irreligious types, they might well have been conservative monks who firmly held to certain forms of the Buddhist teachings, and who opposed new ideas of Buddhahood. Later on, according to Karashima, in such texts as the Ratna, gotra, vibhāga, *icchantika* seems to mean “one who desires transmigration.”⁹²

The term *icchantika* has been translated into Chinese with various interpretations that lie outside the scope of the definition provided above, including: *duànshàngēn* 斷善根 (“one who has cut off the good roots”) and *xìnbùjùzú* 信不具足 (“lacking faith”). The *Fānyì míngyì jí* 翻譯名義集 defines an *icchantika* as

不信因果,	<i>bùxìn yīnguǒ</i>	one who does not believe in cause and effect,
無有慚愧,	<i>wúyǒu cǎnkūi</i>	who has no moral shame,
不信業報,	<i>bùxìn yèbào</i>	who does not believe in karmic results,
不見現在及未來世,	<i>bùjiàn xiànzài jí wèilái shì</i>	who sees not the present and future lives,
不親善友,	<i>bùqīn shànyǒu</i>	who is not close to spiritual friends,
不隨諸佛所說教誡	<i>bùsuī zhūfó suǒshuō jiàojiè</i>	who does not follow the Buddha’s teachings and precepts.

(翻譯名義集 T54.2131.1084a27-29)

Interestingly, the term *icchantika* is used in some contexts to refer to bodhisattvas. Since they have taken a vow to liberate all sentient beings eschewing the goal of self-liberation, they, like real *icchantika*, will never attain liberation. These bodhisattvas, however, are called *dàbēichāntí* 大悲闡提, “the *icchantikas* of great mercy.”

Here, it is relevant to point out a popular misconception of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas, that they “postpone their awakening for the sake of the task of enlightening or saving other beings.” So far there is no authentic Mahāyāna scripture that supports this notion. It somehow has become a part of popular Mahāyāna lore. What the Mahāyāna texts claim is that *these Bodhisattvas reject the enlightenment of the pratyeka-buddhas and arhats, and vow to attain full enlightenment (that of the Buddha) so that they can liberate all beings.*⁹³

4.3.3 Precepts and Buddha-nature.

4.3.3.1 DAOIST AND CONFUCIANIST ROOTS OF CHINESE MORALITY. If we have been exposed to a certain kind of ideology since birth (like Confucianism in the case of the ancient Chinese, or Theravada in the case of the modern Sinhalese, for example) it would be easy to be unconsciously rooted in them, so that despite ourselves, such a pre-conditioning would colour both our daily lives and the significant moments in between. And when this received faith is unexamined, it is taken for granted and takes on a life of its own.

Through Daoist pre-conditioning and the lack of grounding in early Buddhism, the Chinese Buddhists evolved their own notion of the innate goodness, even “original salvation,” which they called Buddha-nature (*fóxing* 佛性, **buddhatva*). Daoism provided the ancient Chinese Buddhists with the provisional vocabulary to have some idea of profound Buddhist concepts, but in doing so, made the concepts more Daoist than Buddhist. [2.2]

⁹² For technical details, see [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?4e.xml+id\('b4e00-95e1-63d0'\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?4e.xml+id('b4e00-95e1-63d0')).

⁹³ See eg Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 1989: 52-54.

Through Confucianist pre-conditioning [2.3] and the Mahayana ideal, the Chinese Buddhists built up their own *filiality-centred value-system*, cherishing filial piety to biological parents and to religious patriarchs, idealized into their religious lineage system [5]. Confucianism was well established as the state ideology as early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE-25 CE), but it was only with the technological, socio-economic, and political changes of the Sòng that Confucianism really seeped into every level of Chinese society.⁹⁴

And when we bring the two powerful pre-conditionings together, we have the Chinese Buddhist notion of “salvation through works” (to borrow a theological phrase), that is, the belief that keeping to the precepts is in itself an expression of one’s awakened nature. The Daoist spontaneity in the Chinese religious mind could not accept the psychologically structured early Buddhist dynamics of moral virtue, that it is merely an ambience and support for mental cultivation. The Chinese Buddhists felt that moral virtue should be a spontaneous expression of the awakened nature (*xingjiè* 性戒) or Buddha-nature.

4.3.3.2 ZŌNGMÌ & YÁNSHÒU. John McRae, in his *Seeing Through Zen*, classified the Chán revolving around the Sixth Patriarch controversy as “Early Chán” (7th-8th century)⁹⁵ [5.2]. It was also a period of “rhetorical Chán” and “metropolitan Chán” [5.2.3.1], where lineage theories were promoted through transmission records (*dēng lù* 燈錄) as a unifying ideology. By the Sòng period, influential monks like Yǒngmíng Yánshòu 永明延壽 (904-975)⁹⁶ of Hangzhou propagated a “moderate Chán,” where sacred texts and rituals were accommodated as skilful means, where “sudden awakening” was followed by “gradual practice,” and where Chán was seen as being in harmony with the scriptures, in fact, as their culmination.⁹⁷

After the period of Early Chán—and with the loss of the patronage of the state and the gentry as a result of troubled times and social change [7.4.1]—influential Chinese monks like Zōngmì 宗密 (780-841)⁹⁸ and Yánshòu looked for other means of legitimizing Buddhism and authenticating their practice. Instead of looking *outside* the Buddhist fold for legitimation, they sought *within* Buddhism for religious authentication, that is, through emphasizing the practice of moral virtue as it is envisioned in China. There was, of course, a strategic reason for this, which we will examine for the rest of this section.

Zōngmì and Yánshòu echoed the prevalent popular notion that genuine precepts should be a spontaneous expression of the awakened nature rather than be “apparent precepts” (*xiāngjiè* 相戒) of inflexible maxims, that is, “dead letters.”⁹⁹ To these great minds, moral conduct and foundation were indispensable for the well-being of the Mahayana Buddhist community. However, they saw moral virtue as “internal precepts” that superseded the “external rules” of a foreign Buddhism, and was against “being attached to the provisional, Hinayanist regulations.” (*Sānbùlǜ chāo* 三部律抄, T85.2793.675c).

⁹⁴ So effective was the Confucian state ideology that even long after the Song dynasty’s demise, its officials and generals would sacrifice themselves or vow undying allegiance (Schirokauer, *A Brief History of Chinese Civilization*, 1991: 145).

⁹⁵ McRae’s classification of the phases of Chán: Proto-Chán (c 500-600): Bodhidharma, Huike, *Treatise on the Two Entrances and Four Practices*; Early Chán (c 600-900): Hongren, Shenxiu, Huineng, Shenhui; Northern, Southern, Oxhead factions; *Sixth Patriarch Platform Sutra*; Middle Chán (c 750-1000): Mazu, Shitou, Linji, Xuefeng Xicun; Hongzhou and Hubei factions; antecedents of the Five Houses; *Anthology of the Patriarchal Hall*; Song-dynasty Chán (c 950-1300): Dahui, Hongzhi; Five Houses, Linji & Caodong schools; *Blue Cliff Record*. See McRae 2003: 11-21.

⁹⁶ See Albert Welter, “The problem with orthodoxy in Zen Buddhism,” 2002.

⁹⁷ See Albert Welter 2002: 6.

⁹⁸ Fully, *Guīfēng Zōngmì* 圭峰宗密, Táng dynasty scholar-monk and 5th patriarch of the Huáyán school 華嚴宗 & a patriarch of the Hézé 荷澤 Chán lineage. He wrote a number of vitally important essays on the current situation of Tang Buddhism, and is one of the most important figures in East Asian Buddhist history in terms of providing modern scholars with a clear analysis of the development of Chán and Huáyán and the general intellectual and religious climate of his times. Unlike some of his more radical and cryptic Chán contemporaries, he was a sober and meticulous scholar who wrote extensive critical analyses of the various Chán and scholastic sects of the period, as well as numerous scriptural exegeses. See [http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?5b.xml+id\(b5b97-5bc6\)](http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?5b.xml+id(b5b97-5bc6)).

⁹⁹ Cf “dead-word” (*sǐzì* 死字) [5.1.3.6].

4.3.3.3 TECHNOLOGICAL CONFUCIANISM. The rise of Confucianism during the Míng was significantly boosted by the technological progress of the times. In 953, for example, the Confucian classics with their commentaries were published in 130 volumes, which were amongst *the first printed works in world history* (Hucker 1975: 336). The printing industry grew in the Sòng, when the movable type was developed using pottery, tin, and woodblocks. By the Míng, abundant supplies of paper and ink, as well as advances in binding technology made books affordable, and more importantly (for the rulers), this allowed the effective and accurate transmission of ideas all over the empire (FAN Jialing 2001: 12). The publication of religious, agricultural, and technological treatises, and encyclopaedias, fiction and colloquial literature in large numbers had rendered a high proportion of the Chinese population literate in the Yuan, Míng, and Qíng times (Hucker 1975: 337).

As such, even people of meagre means and those in remote rural regions could more easily come under the sway of Confucian ideology. In many ways, this “technological Confucianism” was an excellent example of mediaeval Chinese *behaviourism*, long before their western counterpart.¹⁰⁰ The basic dynamics of behaviourism as used in politics is basically twofold: by reward and punishment, and by fear and favour. The Míng founding emperor, **Míng Tàizǔ** 明太祖 (r 1368-1398), an erstwhile monk himself,¹⁰¹ evidently thought that *intellectual Buddhism would liberate the minds of the people, making them more difficult to rule*. Confucianism, on the other hand, was just the right tool, an essentially behaviourist ideology that regulated social behavior in a hierarchy of power.

In other words, when the Confucianists and their elitist ideology worked hand in glove with the rulers, Buddhism, as a rule, was put at a great disadvantage. The Buddhists would be very fortunate if the Confucianists at court did not instigate a purge, as was the case on a number of occasions in Chinese history [7.4.1]. During the pre-Míng period, the usual excuses for purges against the Buddhists were that it was a foreign religion or that the monasteries were draining away the wealth and human resources of

¹⁰⁰ On *behaviourism*, see **Meditation and Consciousness** = SD 17.8c (3.3) & also <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/>.

¹⁰¹ **Míng Tàizǔ**: this is a title meaning, “The great Míng ancestor.” His real name was **Zhū Yuánzhāng** 朱元璋 (1328-1398), who at 16, on account of poverty and widespread natural disaster, sought refuge in a local monastery, living there as a monk, but was forced to leave when it, too, ran out of funds. After living as a vagrant, begging for his food, he returned to his old monastery, remaining there until he was 24. There he learned to read and write from the monks. However, in later years, although sympathetic to Buddhism, he was not himself a Buddhist. After his monastery was burned down by the Mongol army, he joined one of the many local rebel groups in 1352. Through his natural qualities of leadership, determination, warriorhood, and brilliant mind, he rapidly rose to be the group’s leader. His group then joined the Red Turban Movement, married the leader’s daughter, and upon the leader’s death in 1355, took over the leadership at 27. He conquered Nanjing, a major city, and through good administration, its population increase tenfold within 10 years, filled mostly with refugees fleeing from the Mongols. Despite a few major setbacks (like a split in the Red Turban itself), Zhū was able to attract a number of skilled advisers. In 1366, with his defeating a major warload of Hangzhou, he controlled the whole Yangtze and much territory north and south of it. With other major warlords now submitting to him, they marched north to attack the Mongols, but who curiously decided to retreat northwards without a fight. In 1368 Zhū proclaimed himself the Míng emperor in Nanjing, and adopted the title 洪武 *Hóngwǔ* for his reign. Under his design the state assumed absolute control over all aspects of society, with the emperor as absolute autocrat, without any prime minister. Between 1376 and 1393, to consolidate his power, he staged four waves of political purges that claimed around 100,000 lives, among them ministers, generals, local gentry, and clan leaders. All things Mongol (incl Buddhism as practised by them) were rejected. Sensing that the Mongols were still a threat, he reversed the Confucian orthodox view that the scholar bureaucrat was above the military. Knowing the harmful role that eunuchs often played in court intrigues, he drastically reduced their number, duties and influence. He accepted the Confucian view that merchants were parasitic, and promoted a very successful system of self-supporting agricultural communities. He reigned for 30 years. Despite this, trade continued to grow throughout his empire, especially where the soil was poor, and the population large. Belgian sinologist and writer Simon Leys (Pierre Ryckmans’s pen-name) described Zhū as “an adventurer from peasant stock, poorly educated, a man of action, a bold and shrewd tactician, a visionary mind, in many respects a creative genius; naturally coarse, cynical, and ruthless, he eventually showed symptoms of paranoia, bordering on psychopathy.” (“Ravished by Oranges” in *New York Review of Books*, 20 Dec 2007: 8).

See http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761580643/ming_dynasty.html.

the empire. Now that the Buddhist elite had been brought down and domesticated, the Confucian-minded court worked on keeping it that way, and the behaviourist system work extremely well against the Buddhists of the times. [4.3.3.8]

The Chinese Buddhists may be down, but they were not out. Both the Dharma-driven and the self-propelled remain motivated. The Dharma-driven remembered the spirituality of their faith, while the self-propelled dreamt of the ease, wealth and comfort of monastic life as they saw it. *If there is no God, it will be necessary to create him*, quipped the French atheist Voltaire. The Chinese Buddhists were always adaptable and innovative: they created the Bodhisattva precepts.

4.3.3.4 THE RISE OF BODHISATTVA PRECEPTS. The practice of Bodhisattva precepts during the Míng 明 dynasty (1368-1643) has already been mentioned [2.3.7]. The roots of these novel precepts were in the Sòng 宋 period (960-1279), which saw a rise of various versions of “Bodhisattva precepts,” based on apocryphal works whose popularization coincided with medieval Chinese technological and socio-political developments (especially printing and imperial administrative centralization). These changes brought on a greater Confucianization of Chinese society, especially during the Sòng period, reaching its apex in the Míng (1368-1643), when the Vinaya ceremonies were officially banned [2.3.7].¹⁰² In the face of such challenges, the Chinese Buddhists tailored the Bodhisattva precepts to Confucian ethical norms, and which were then quickly accepted by the Chinese populace.¹⁰³

The groundwork for the rise of the Bodhisattva precepts was already present in the pragmatic and survivalist minds of the Chinese Buddhists. Yánshòu, for example, was convinced that moral injunctions should first and foremost be based on the innately endowed “precept of the Buddha-mind” (*fóxīn jiè* 佛心戒) (TX105.8d), appealing to Chinese apocryphal preceptive texts such as the *Púsà yīngluò běnyè jīng* 菩薩瓔珞本業經, which proclaimed that, “All mundane and transmudane precepts have the mind as their essence,”¹⁰⁴ and the *Fànwǎng jīng* 梵網經 [2.3.5] which affirmed that the specific regulatory articles were merely “expedient,” while the “immaculate mind-ground of the original self-nature” is the essence underlying external precepts.¹⁰⁵

To Zōngmì and Yánshòu, the reduction of the various Vinaya codes available in China to a single and intrinsically moral mind serves a dual purpose. Firstly, they wanted to ward off antinomianism by establishing moral training on a more affirmative ontological ground. They thought that the positive teaching of the Buddha Mind would rouse moral action rather than negative discourse of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Here, they were guided by the early Hīnayāna model of the threefold training where moral virtue forms the basis for mental cultivation.

At the same time, the conception of Buddha Mind was broad and flexible enough to “subsume, and therefore subvert, whatever regulatory articles that were deemed regressive and cumbersome for the existing Buddhist institution” (Chu 2006: 3, digital ed). Surely, they thought, *the mind* is the root of all goodness, and therefore more effective in validating precepts relevant to changing times. This was clearly brilliant piece of philosophizing, or at least, rationalization.

Even the precepts as found in such texts as the *Dàbān nièpán jīng* 大般涅槃經, the *Púsà dìchí jīng* 菩薩地持經, and the *Yōupósài jiè jīng* 優婆塞戒經 [4.3.3.9] were not effective in countering the powerful Confucian undercurrents. Indigenous texts, such as the *Fànwǎng jīng*, whose versatile interpretation of

¹⁰² This reminds me of a very sad incident in the early 1990s when, as a monk, I was invited speak before a band of young short-term novices in a large Syam Nikaya Buddhist mission in KL, Malaysia. What better topic, I thought, would be appropriate for them than the Vinaya. So I spoke on it in the manner I was trained in Thailand. After the talk, I was politely confronted with the notion that *if the novices knew too much about the Vinaya, they might not think of becoming monks!* Such a remark for the mission *mahā, nāyaka* left me utterly confused. Does this mean that if the novices knew less, or better nothing, about the Vinaya, they would become better monks? What sort of monks would they be? Anyway, that was the last time I was ever invited to the mission. (Piyasilo, *Buddhist Currents*, 1992a: 45).

¹⁰³ The rest of this section is mostly based on a summary of William Chu, “Bodhisattva precepts in the Ming Society,” 2006.

¹⁰⁴ Quoted by RAN Yunhua 1995: 259.

¹⁰⁵ *Fànwǎng jīng zhǐjiě*, 1984: 520. See William Chu 2006: 3 (digital ed).

the precepts is congruous with the “Buddha-mind” theory, and their precepts uphold such Confucian ideals as filial piety and obeisance to one’s social superiors, encompassed both monastics and laity alike. The *Fànwǎng jīng*, for example, assures that “the singular practice of filial piety encompasses the entirety of Buddhist precepts,” and that “precepts are [all] about filial piety” (*Fànwǎng jīng zhījiě*, 1984: 537-539)—these are hardly early Indian Buddhist sentiments

4.3.3.5 THE IMPACT OF A CENTRALIZED CHINA. Beginning with the Sòng dynasty, the greatly centralized state implemented systematic religious regulation and routinization of Buddhism in an unprecedented manner. The emperor was an absolute autocrat and his powers fanned out on every level of society through the imperial administrative officers and organs. Religious laws restricted temple construction, the number of ordinations and the size of the ordained population. There was a whole bureaucracy of government-appointed monk-officials (*sēngguān* 僧官) to administer the Buddhist community.¹⁰⁶ A temple was classified and run as either “public” or “hereditary,” and its inheritance procedures were completely under active government supervision (Schlüter 2005). [7.2.2]

Such an administrative set-up showed that the government was increasingly aware of the strategic importance of regulating religions. In the past, Buddhist monasteries, for example, had control of huge funds, vast tracts of land, and manpower (monastics, temple labourers and slaves).¹⁰⁷ All this contributed to a drain on the national economy. Now all these could be re-diverted into the imperial system. The government further benefitted from taking over the lucrative sale of ordination certificates, especially when there was a need for immediate funds. [5.2.35-26]

During the absolute autocracy of **Míng Tàizǔ** 明太祖¹⁰⁸ (r 1368-1398) [4.3.3.3], an erstwhile monk himself, even entry into the Chinese sangha was strictly regulated. In 1391, for example, he laid out these *strict criteria for ordination*, which interestingly reflected his practical understanding the monastic system:

[A monk-aspirant] must be over fourteen but under twenty. He must have his parents’ permission. After having reported to the magistrate and been recommended by his neighbors, he may go to a monastery to study under a teacher. After five years, when he is well versed in the scriptures, he may go to the Bureau of Buddhist Affairs for examination. If he is proved to be proficient in the scriptures, only then is he given an ordination certificate. If he cannot pass the examination, then he is returned to lay life. If his parents are unwilling, if there is no other son or grandson to serve the parents or grandparents, a person is not allowed to leave household life. If anyone is over thirty or forty years of age, has previously been a monk but later returned to lay life, is an escaped convict, or has been tattooed for committing some crime, he will not be allowed to leave household life. (YÜ Chün-fang, 1981: 158)

The strict state control over religion during the Míng kept many aspirants out of the monastic life, but this did not deter those who were determined or resourceful enough. Their main recourse would be the Bodhisattva precepts. In contrast to such stringent official measures, the Bodhisattva precepts, despite being apocryphal, clearly laid out an open attitude towards aspirants for ordination. According to the *Púsà yīngluò jīng*, even the leader of an ordination ceremony could be a lay person. Anyone could administer the precepts to even his or her spouse.¹⁰⁹ Those excluded from ordination by the Vinaya—“deities, demons, lascivious men and women, hermaphrodites, and those without sexual organs”—were all permitted to receive the Bodhisattva ordination precepts. As William Chu notes, “This comparative tolerance on the part of the Bodhisattva precepts must have been a welcoming gesture to many certificate purchasers, who might have bought their monastic status precisely because of their questionable backgrounds and social standing.” (2006: 6 digital ed)

¹⁰⁶ CHEN Yongge 2001: 366.

¹⁰⁷ On slavery in China, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_slavery, see under China.

¹⁰⁸ Ie, the enthroned Zhū Yuánzhāng 朱元璋.

¹⁰⁹ Paul Groner notes that this practice “was adopted in a number of commentaries, including those by Chitsang and I-chi.” (1990: 256).

4.3.3.6 THE BODHISATTVA PRECEPTS AND SELF-ORDINATION. When the selling of ordination certificates [4.3.3.7] and self-ordination were diligent proscribed by the authorities, and legitimate formal ordination was severely restricted, most aspirants were cut off from monasticism. Those fervent enough in their desire for ordination, found some solace in the apocryphal Bodhisattva precepts.

The famous late-Ming monk, **Yúnqī Zhūhóng** 雲棲祿宏 (1535-1615),¹¹⁰ spoke of his experiences in resorting to the Bodhisattva precepts, thus: “[Under] the present government, performing Vinaya ceremonies is forbidden. I wish to improve the situation, but I do not want to violate the law. Instead, I have the Sangha in my temple read the Brahma-net Sūtra [*Fànwǎng jīng*] and Bhikṣu Precepts every two weeks. Monks from near and far join us for this reason.”¹¹¹ [2.3.7]

The *Fànwǎng jīng*, and *Púsà yīngluò jīng* in particular [4.3.3.4], clearly permitted and gave instructions on self-initiation into precepts. Instead of the prescribed presence of a quorum of monks and the elaborate ordination act, the novice needed only to stand before an image of the Buddha or Bodhisattva as vicarious preceptor.

The aspirants performed penitence and invocation rituals, and waited for “propitious signs,” such as being physically bathed in “divine” lights, or having dreams of the chosen Buddha or Bodhisattva.¹¹² Any kind of appropriate sign was sufficient as an indication that one had been purged of evil karma and was now endowed with the “precept substance” (*jiètǐ* 戒體) directly by the invoked deity. Such a simple procedure was a free and simple alternative for the devotee during a time when government policies and social conditions favoured Tantric rituals over Vinaya formalism.

The emperor, who issued all such edicts, was astute enough to know that *the Vinaya would strengthen the monastics as a community* and their exemplary behaviour would attract public support, especially the literate and the gentry. The Tantric rituals appealed more to the grassroots with needs for immediate and simple solutions to personal and material problems, and it was as a rule, *a commercial transaction*: the client donated (paid) for all such services, which as such were lucrative without the need of any moral standard. As such, institutional Buddhism was effectively disempowered.

On the other hand, for ordination certificate purchasers who generally lacked public recognition or self-confidence on account of their commercially-obtained monastic status, being Tantric ritualists conferred upon themselves a sense of religious empowerment and social acceptance. [More at 4.3.3.7]

Even some Ming patriarchs started off by resorting to self-ordination, simply out of necessity. The famous late-Ming monk, **Ōuyì Zhixù** 藕益智旭 (1599-1655), for example, “received” both his monastic and Bodhisattva precepts before the image of the late renowned monk Yúnqī Zhūhóng (1535-1615), whom Zhixu must have regarded as a Bodhisattva candidate, and whose image could therefore be used as a vicarious preceptor.¹¹³ [2.3.7]

¹¹⁰ Zhuhong was an important Buddhist leader in the late Ming period (1368-1644). He was a reformer of monastic Buddhism, who synthesized various Buddhist traditions, and was a successful promoter of lay Buddhism. Although regarded posthumously as the 8th Pure Land patriarch, his influence was not confined to any sect. He has, in fact, been credited with the renewal of Buddhism in Ming China. See <http://www.bookrags.com/research/zhuhong-eorl-14/>.

¹¹¹ *Liánchí dàshī quánjì* 蓮池大師權跡, cited in SHI Shengyan, 1991: 46.

¹¹² The reliance on “propitious signs” for penitent, divinatory, and religious legitimation purposes was widespread by the Ming period. This trend is attested by the popularity of such apocryphal texts as “The Sutra on the Divination of the Effects of Good and Evil Actions” *Zhànchá shàn’è yèbào jīng* 占察善惡業報經 (T839.17.901c-910c). See CHŌ Kyogen, *Mingmatsu chūgoku bukkyō no kenkyū*, 1976: 246-247, & Whalen Lai, “The *Chan-ch’a ching*: Religion and Magic in Medieval China,” 1990: 175-206. The reliance dreams as a legitimation for spirituality has ancient roots in Early Chán [3.4.4.3].

¹¹³ See Zhixu’s accounts in his autobiography, *Ouyi dashi quanji* 6:1007-1008. For a very detailed discussion of Zhixu’s connection with the *Fànwǎng jīng* and his view on penitence and purging of karma, see CHŌ Kyogen 1990: esp 192-282.

Another important self-ordained monk was **Gǔxīn Rúxīn** 古心如馨 (1541-1615), the founder of the modern day Chinese Vinaya lineage.¹¹⁴ Ruxin was said to have ascended Mt Wutai (*Wútái shān* 五台山), where he “received” his precepts in a propitious dream, in which the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī conferred upon him the “precept substance.”¹¹⁵ “It is indeed both intriguing and ironic,” notes William Chu, “to think about what implications this story may have on the legitimacy of modern Chinese monasticism as a whole, which, as the story would have it, was transmitted without the staple requirement but through this alternative, fantastic channel sanctioned only by the apocrypha.” (2006: 8, digital ed) [4.3.3.10]

4.3.3.7 ORDINATION CERTIFICATES. Despite severe restrictions, ordination certificates continued to be sold after the Hóngwǔ 洪武 reign of Zhū Yuánzhāng, simply because they were lucrative for both the seller and the buyer [2.3.6]. The severe government restrictions on Buddhist monasticism included strict criteria for ordination, a limit on the number of ordination ceremonies (once every 3 years) and the number of ordinands within a given period of time (40 per prefecture and 20 per district) (Groner 1990: 158). Even then, such ceremonies were of a poor standard. They were often hastily and perfunctorily done, without any preliminary briefing on the finer points of monastic discipline and basic etiquette.¹¹⁶ Often, these ordination ceremonies were overseen by unsympathetic Confucian officials, and corruption and favouritism were rampant.¹¹⁷ [5.2.3.5]

Timothy Brook comments that the government selling of ordination certificates did “more to weaken the *sangha* than all the conscious attempts by the post-Tang state to limit the power of Buddhism.” (1992: 32). The government’s growing dependence on the funds raised through ordination ceremonies and monastic training only further reduced their quality. To relieve famines and other national crises, ordination certificates were sold on several occasions for ten *dàn* 石¹¹⁸ of rice, each time numbering as many as 100,000 copies within just a matter of years.¹¹⁹ By the Jiājīng 嘉靖 era of emperor Shìzōng 世宗 (1521-1566, late Míng), the government seemed so involved with the practice that ordination certificates were exclusively and regularly sold by it.¹²⁰ A contemporary Buddhist complained of false monks in their midst:

Ordination in former times was invariably determined by examination. Those qualified were given certificates and robes and the chance to have their heads shaven. Ordination in these days, as a general rule, is a matter of submitting money [to the government]... Now that no authentic verification is available, there is no way to confirm one’s monastic status... [In consequence,] there are many who became monks because their previous crimes were exposed, or because they have escaped from prisons, or because they have abused and turned their backs against their parents. Some had fights with their wives, some ran away and leaving their debts derelict, some simply had no other means of livelihood than becoming a monk.

(*Kaigu Lu, Manji Zokuzokyo* 114.729-732)

¹¹⁴ According to Shengyan, the “two lineages” of the Míng were founded by Ruxin and Zhuhong. Only Ruxin’s line survived and is considered to be the source of modern Chinese monastic tradition (1991: 46).

¹¹⁵ Shi Shengyan 1991: 46.

¹¹⁶ *Chuánjiè zhèngfàn* 傳戒正範, in *Manji Zokuzokyo* 107.22a.

¹¹⁷ *Míng shí lù. Yīngzōng shí lù* 明實錄: 英宗實錄, cited in Zhang Zhiqiang, 2001: 359.

¹¹⁸ A dry measure for grain equals to 10 *dǒu* 斗 (a peck, where 1 imperial peck = 9.09218 litres).

¹¹⁹ Fan Jialing, 2001: 46. The first major sales of certificates in the Míng took place in 1451, 1453, and 1454, costing 5 piculs of rice per certificate and they were transported to Guizhou. The price steadily grew over time, reaching 10 taels of silver by 1540. Yü 1981: 160-161.

¹²⁰ Fan Jialing, 2001; 46. For a detailed account on how strict payment replaced all government qualifications for becoming monastics, see Yü 1981: 161 f. The *Kǎigǔ lù* 慨古錄 (Xuzangjing 65.1285) mention the effect of the closing down of all official ordination ceremonies and the proscription against Buddhist congregations for more than 50 years between the Jiājīng and the Wanli eras in favour of money-for-certificate policy, that people could not tell monastics and lay people apart because of the monastics’ lack of defining etiquette and precepts. (*Manji Zokuzokyo* 114.728-729)

The list goes on to give a list of appalling abuses of monastic purity arising from the government's selling of ordination certificates.¹²¹

4.3.3.8 RISE OF RITUAL BUDDHISM. Even the utility and sanctity of the traditional Vinaya was not spared by government intervention. The Míng emperor Tàizǔ [4.3.3.3] classified Buddhist public temples into three kinds, following their designated specialization: “meditation” (*chán* 禪), “doctrinal studies and exegesis” (*jiǎng* 講), and “ritual performance” (*yújiā* 瑜伽).¹²² Although the first two categories were old ones retained throughout the preceding Sòng and Yuan dynasties, the third, “ritual performance,” was a novelty replacing the traditional category of “discipline” (*lǜ* 律).

The new category of ritualists, according to the emperor himself, was so that Tantric services performed *on behalf of the deceased* could provide “filial sons and grandsons a means by which to repay the benefaction of their parents and grandparents” (id). The implication was clear: *filial duties* superseded other Buddhist virtues outlined in the Vinaya. The displacement of “monastic discipline,” as a distinct monastic specialization, by “ritual performance,” had far-reaching consequences on the development of Buddhism. Yü Chün-fang is of the opinion that the decline in Buddhist monastic discipline, and the commercialization of Buddhism revolving around public ritual services characteristic of Chinese Buddhism from the Míng era onwards was *the result of Tàizǔ's reforms*. (1981: 178 f)

Tàizǔ's policies ironically turned out to one-sidedly favour monastics specializing in “ritual performance.” Not only were monastics of the other specializations forbidden from regular contacts with lay people and their activities restricted to monastic premises, but he also totally banned the monastic alms-rounds (*huàyuán* 化緣), but “ritual monastics” could freely roam the city streets performing their more lucrative services (Yü 1981: 150 f). Monastics naturally became Tantric ritualists in droves as a means of securing a lucrative livelihood, and consequently neglecting their monastic discipline.¹²³

Inevitably, *ritual temples counted as the majority of the three kinds of temples* in the early Míng.¹²⁴ Shi Guodeng pointed out that a related feature about Míng preceptive practices was the wide incorporation of Tantric elements for daily usage (2003: 189). The traditional precepts were gradually being displaced by *mantric confession rites, and celebrations of the “birthdays” of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas* became the most significant activities of the monasteries.

4.3.3.9 CHINESE BUDDHIST SOCIAL VALUES. Through the work of such monks as Yúnqī Zhūhóng 雲棲祿宏 [4.3.3.6], the Míng era saw an unprecedented growth of lay Buddhist organizations actively participating in philanthropic projects and the promulgation of familial and syncretistic moral exhortations. Local societies and religious organizations like the Shàn huì 善會, the Jīnsù shè 金粟社, the Shènglián shè 勝蓮社, the Dàn shè 澹社, and the Yuè huì 月會 sponsored periodic meetings to read Confucian texts, moral allegories, Buddhist scriptures, and share common vegetarian meals and perform the releasing of animals, with many boasting of learned and elite memberships (MAO Peiqi 1996: 246). It was no surprise then that many members of such organizations were also Bodhisattva-preceptees, who would regard their involvement in such groups as a part of keeping to their Bodhisattva-precept ideals.

In the Míng, this preoccupation with preserving and promoting of *familial reputation* was reinforced by heightened clan consciousness. The abovementioned *bǎo jiǎ* 保甲¹²⁵ and *lǐ jiǎ* 里甲¹²⁶ networks were designed to organize and regiment local villages by strengthening links and networking amongst clan

¹²¹ See Chu 2006: 6 f (digital ed).

¹²² *Shishi jigulue xuji. Xuzang jing* 16.2, cited in ZHANG Zhiqiang, 2001: 357.

¹²³ The famous Chinese Republican Buddhist reformer Tàixū 太虛 (1890-1947) [4.5], described the corruptions found in the Buddhism of his time as being largely the vestiges of this old, inveterate fixation on commercial rituals (*Tàixū dàshī quánshū* 太虛大師全書18: 604-605). Yīnshùn 印順 (1906-2005), too, thought that Tàizǔ's rigid classification of temples and the emphasis on ritual performance over Vinaya studies in the Míng persisted into modern Chinese Buddhism, and were responsible for the generally poor quality of monastics and their narrow ritualist specialization (*Fójiào shǐdì kǎolùn* 佛教史地考論, 1981: 86).

¹²⁴ Ryūchi Kiyoshi, cited in Yü, 1981: 149.

¹²⁵ *Bǎojiǎ* or neighbourhood mutual watch programme. See Thomas Brook 2005: 19.

¹²⁶ *Lǐjiǎ*, or hundred-and-tithing system, grouped households for census and fiscal purposes. See Thomas Brook 2005: 19.

members.¹²⁷ In such a *Gemeinschaft* (or “kampong”) situation,¹²⁸ with its tightly knit familial units under the supervision of local leaders and elders, individual deviance from social, ethical and intellectual norms was clearly conspicuous and rejected. By the same token, individual success brought prestige and pride to all members within the larger group. The stereotypical Chinese aversion to bringing *shame* (“losing face”) to family was largely the vestige of this traditional loyalty to one’s clan and extended families, which was arguably one of the most powerful instruments at instilling Confucian values and a sense of belonging to familial lineages even among members of the Chinese peasantry.

Ming society went through fundamental changes in people’s attitudes towards *romantic relationships*, economic behavior, and even general attitude towards life.¹²⁹ In both teaching and practice, the natural course for Buddhism in urban Ming society would be to adapt itself into a more flexible and cosmopolitan religiosity accommodating these new values. Here again the Bodhisattva precepts fulfilled the role of a socially adaptive ethical model. Unlike the imported Mahāyāna preceptive texts, such as the *Yōupósài jiè jīng* (優婆塞戒經, *Upāsaka, śīla Sūtra*) [4.3.3.4], which spelt out moral instructions for monastics, the indigenous *Yīngluò jīng* and *Fànwǎng jīng* contained counsels on virtuous lay living and related situations of a city dweller.¹³⁰

These apocryphal texts were also conveniently vague, compared to, say, the *Yújiā púsà jiè běn* 瑜伽菩薩戒本, on issues of “precept-suspension in special occasions” (*kāi [zhē] fǎ* 開[遮]法), allowing for greater latitude in a complex urban culture. The imported Bodhisattva preceptive texts often spelled out the specific conditions in painstaking detail, leaving little room for negotiation. The Bodhisattva precepts, on the other hand, allowed “special occasions” for temporary suspension of the observance of certain precepts. This latitude is possible because these apocryphal precepts were understood to emphasize the inherent purity of the mind rather than the strict observance of inflexible rules.¹³¹ [2.3.7]

4.3.3.10 THE VALIDITY OF SELF-ORDINATION. Let us now reflect on what we have discussed in this chapter (especially in connection with self-ordination and the purpose of monasticism) [4.3.3.6] in the light of some troubling trends in our own times. In 1993, Sangharakshita, a renegade English guru, wrote *Forty-Three Years Ago: Reflections on my Bhikkhu Ordination on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Western Buddhist Order*, in which he basically (consciously or unconsciously) tried to rationalize his non-celibate lifestyle with his monkhood by attempting to make a distinction between a “Vinaya-style” monasticism and a “Sūtra-style” monasticism (1995: 12). By “Sūtra-style,” he meant “a full time spiritual life defined by commitment and practice rather than technical status, and to recognize, even, that a ‘bad’ monk might be the better Buddhist than a good one”! (1995: 10). Ironically, in some way, his defensive rationalization actually described, *in a positive sense*, the fervent Chinese aspirant who self-ordained himself in difficult times, as described above. Sangharakshita, however, was trying

¹²⁷ See Timothy Brook, *The Chinese State in Ming Society*, 2005: 32-40.

¹²⁸ *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are sociological categories introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies for two normal (ie conceptual) types of human association. *Gemeinschaft* (often tr as “community”) is an association in which individuals are oriented to the large association as much if not more than to their own self interest. Furthermore, individuals in a *Gemeinschaft* are regulated by common mores, or beliefs about the appropriate behavior and responsibility of members of the association, to each other and to the association at large; associations marked by “unity of will.” In contrast, *Gesellschaft* (often tr as “society” or “civil society” or “association”) describes interactions in which, for the individual, the larger association never takes on more importance than individual self-interest, and lack the same level of shared mores. *Gesellschaft* is maintained through individuals acting in their own self interest. A modern business is a good example of *Gesellschaft*, where the workers, managers, and owners may have very little in terms of shared orientations or beliefs, they may not care deeply for the product they are making, but it is in all their self-interest to come to work to make money, and thus the business continues. (F Tönnies, ed Jose Harris, *Community and Civil Society*, Cambridge Univ Press, 2001: 22).

¹²⁹ Xu Hong, “*Mingdai fengqi de zhuanbian*,” cited in Fan Jialing, 2001: 17.

¹³⁰ Shi Shengyan argued that the *Fànwǎng jīng*’s appeal to the lay communities and its social adaptability were responsible for its lopsided popularity in China compared to *Yōupósài jiè jīng* (優婆塞戒經, *Upāsaka, śīla Sūtra*). (*Cóng sānjù jīngjiè lùn* 從三聚淨戒論 1993: 24 f)

¹³¹ *Fànwǎng jīng zhǐjiě*, 1984: 520+522.

to rationalize, like Ariṭṭha in the Alagaddūpama Sutta,¹³² his unresolved sexuality with his being a monk! The point is that any kind of sexuality for a monastic, as the Vinaya states, entails the offence of defeat (*pārājika*) (Pār 1 = V 3:23), the very first rule of the monastic code.

Only Ajahn Brahmavamso (from the Thai forest tradition) responded to this serious wrong view by proving, on the basis of his knowledge of and training in the Vinaya, that Sangharakshita actually had received a valid ordination, albeit for a short period of time (and hence, had violated the celibacy rule). As noted by Brahmavamso, it was clear that Sangharakshita had “the misunderstandings of an outsider, one with little experience of the rich and beneficial lifestyles of both the bhikkhu and the layperson in the traditional Theravada countries.”¹³³

In 1995, Sangharakshita replied Brahmavamso in a small book entitled *Was the Buddha a Bhikkhu?*, an aggressive attack on the Theravada establishment, in particular on Ajahn Brahmavamso. In this second book, Sangharakshita attempted to establish that the Buddha himself did not receive an ordination and was therefore of the same non-ordained status as himself!¹³⁴ The Buddha, however, led a totally celibate life but Sangharakshita did not; above all, the Buddha was the first and only fully awakened one in our history.¹³⁵

The point to note here is that even if we were to “self-ordain” (say, when it is difficult to find a competent preceptor), and we were to live in accordance to the spiritual life as envisioned and promulgated by the Buddha, *we would still taste the fruit of awakening*. This “alternative” path to nirvana is broadly hinted at in the Dhammapada:

<i>Alaṅkato ce’pi samam careyya santo danto niyato brahmacārī sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍam so brāhmaṇo so samaṇo sa bhikkhu.</i>	If, though adorned, he practises equanimity, at peace, tamed, restrained, living the holy life, having laid aside the rod towards all beings— he is a brahmin, an ascetic, a monk. (Dh 142)
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That is, provided we take *renunciation* for what it really is (the letting go of worldliness), and not as an excuse to live as a thief to society.¹³⁶ The Commentaries explain that there are four ways of living as a monastic:

- (1) as a thief (*theyya, paribhoga*), that is, as a morally depraved monastic;
- (2) as a debtor (*iṇa, paribhoga*), that is, the unreflective use of requisites by a virtuous monastic;
- (3) as an heir (*dāyajja, paribhoga*), that is, the use made by the seven learners (*sekha*) (excluding one with the fruit of arhathood); and
- (4) as an owner (*sāmi, paribhoga*), that is, the use made by an arhat.
(MA 3:343, 5:32; SA 2:199; J 5:253; Vism 1:125-127/43)

— 080603; 081104; 091202 —

¹³² M 22/1:130-142 = SD 3.13.

¹³³ Review in the journal of the Buddhist Publications Society, 1993.

¹³⁴ *Golden Drum* Oct 1987 No. 6: 12; *Shabda* October 1988:91; Harvey 2000: 429.

¹³⁵ On the Sangharakshita scandal, see <http://www.ex-cult.org/fwbo/Guardian.htm> & <http://www.ex-cult.org/fwbo/fwbofiles.htm>.

¹³⁶ Cf Mahā Kassapa, who for seven days “ate the country’s almsfood as a debtor,” as he became an arhat on the eighth (S 16.11/2:221) = SD 34.16; so too in the case of Bakkula, (M 124.38/3:127) = SD 3.15; cf Talaputa (Tha 1106).